

Bisexuality seems to me an ironic way of saying something about the way one chooses not to only occupy one's biological destiny.

Sexuality, Gender and Sexual Orientation

I restarted this lecture sitting by turns under a tree, on a couch by an open window and at one point I was sitting on a dock. Each location offered a different way to begin, but water was always present. On the dock I found myself periodically staring into the water watching various sized fish drift by and I realized I was often in a preconscious world, feeling the dread of this impending lecture moment, excited and stimulated in my thoughts and lost in the chorus of theoretical voices I had been reading and thinking against. I watched my shadow slide across the water as the sun came up. This was a privileged position to be in and a very different way of entering into thinking about gender and sexual orientation and sexuality than when I was a student in a women's studies program in university and when I first entered into a more comprehensive dialogue with Freud and company after I entered CTP. The major differences are that I am a lot more settled in my own thinking, a lot less defended and a lot quieter in my thoughts.

It was very difficult for me then to come up against a tradition that had truncated Freud into a normative and proscriptive theory in its worst moments. Before I applied to CTP I read a great deal of literature and theory on homosexuals and

their lack of suitability as trainees and eventual therapists. It was one of only two significant moments in my life when I had occasion to think that research and reading were potentially dangerous acts – at least without a context. You can imagine that one of the important questions for my interviewers was whether or not I could be a lesbian and a psychotherapist. Clearly, I've made it past the hurdle of my own first question. One of my interviewers responded in the tradition that is psychotherapy – he let the question hang and then returned to it. That I can not remember what he said is not the point – the point is that he did return to my question and its implicit fear; did not let it slide into silent ignorance. So it is that throughout my thinking career, I return to these questions of gender, sexual orientation and sexuality.

Now, to you. How do you talk about gender and sexual orientation as two separate entities that are yet related? And how do you talk about sexuality anyway? What is sexuality – perverse or otherwise? This cumbersome lecture title is not because I can't decide on what to focus on, it is because these three are topics in their own right and yet intimately related. Think about the daisy chain of elastic bands that kids use to play jumping games with. You link the bands together and you can stretch them out to play – but when you let them go they snap back into their own inevitable snarl.

Before we start with the terminology I thought we might watch a brief animation which I think conveys meaning without the words.

SHOW VIDEO CLIP – Girl and Boy

I would like to take a moment for all of us to look at a few frequently used words and come to some general agreement as to how we will be using them today.

What is: Gender
 Gender Identity
 Biological Sex
 Sexual Orientation
 Sexual Object
 Aim
 Libido
 Perversion
 Homosexuality/Heterosexuality
 Bisexuality
 Transsexual
 Transgenderd
 Transvestite
 Masculine
 Feminine

You can see that a certain amount of clarity at the beginning end of things is very useful.

It might be fair to say that boys and girls have similar and different process tasks in negotiating the first seven years of their life and leave it at that. I am referring to that period in all our lives that constitutes the pre-oedipal, oedipal and post oedipal period. I'm guessing at the moment that we are all mostly post-oedipal.

Both boys and girls possess a relatively similar psychic potential for possibilities, they both have multiple developmental lines to follow - psychosexual

development being only one, and they both have to navigate same and cross-sex relationships at some point. As family constellations change this latter fact will always remain true – the operative phrase being – at some point, and it is that qualifier “at some point” that will help us theoretically later on. Freud pointed out that “variations in the chronological order and in the linking up of these [pre to post oedipal] events are bound to have a very important bearing on the development of the individual”. (Freud, 1924, p.79). This is an essentially important clarification. While there is a direction to the oedipal experience, there are multiple time lines and orders of progression that are roughly chronological. Adrienne Harris’ introduction to Gender as Soft Assembly is a detailed overview of some of the difficulties with thinking of developmental lines as a linear movement towards maturation. How events link up, when, what events occur alongside of each other, against what and in connection with what other developmental lines might be operating at a given moment, lends dimensionality to this theory. This is what I believe Freud was suggesting.

Aside from all of the variables that constitute a unique and individual life one of the major variables that sets children’s tasks apart early on is their biological sex¹. I also cannot at this point enter into a conversation about all the possible variations of biological sex either – forms of hermaphroditism, different chromosomal combinations, and the assignment of sex at birth when the

¹ This discussion does not attempt to cover those variables based on race, culture, religious faith or economics. Each of these would add a warp and weave that this discussion could never hope to cover.

biological sex is unclear.² If you are interested in understanding these experiences I would direct you to Robert J. Stoller's work or to a very helpful German website that outlines some of the male and female characteristics that occur with chromosomal anomalies:

(<http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sexology/ECE1/index.htm>).

So, for the sake of parsimony – let us stay with: you either have a penis and scrotum, or, you have a clitoris and vagina³.

Before I proceed any further I think it is important that we try to remain true to several tenets that Freud set out as part of the psychodynamic approach that we use in psychotherapy, because they offer us an optimal range of theoretical freedom. The following may not seem immediately relevant to this lecture, but I will ask that you hold them in your mind as a foundation for thinking as we proceed.

First, the principle of free association: this basic formulation allows us to range back and forth in our associations. Nodal points, where unconscious thoughts come together, act like switching stations, places to gather up and disperse from.

² Stoller, Robert. "Facts and fancies: An examination of Freud's concept of bisexuality (1973)". In J. Strouse (Ed.), *Women and analysis* (pp. 391-415). New York: Laurel Editions.

³ Primary, secondary and tertiary sex characteristics are yet another possible way we might develop this conversation. The following website clearly distinguishes these three characteristics. http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sexology/ECE1/practical_classification.htm

At the heart of what free association is, this basic theory insists that everything we have been, are now and our possibilities in the future; remain connected. (Freud, 1923, p. 238) Free association is not so much a therapeutic technique, though it is also that, as a barometer of our psychic possibilities. Freud was very clear that free association operates in both client and therapist. He suggested that by giving oneself up to a form of attention that was not intentional a therapist could better “catch the drift of the patient’s unconscious with his own unconscious”. (Freud, 1923, p. 239) I would add that the commitment not to hold oneself or the other in a fixed position is what potentiates a better understanding of the processes that remain active in understanding, experiencing and expressing gender and sexual orientation.

To this we can add a second tenet; that nothing is ever fully given up, merely displaced. Our dreams show us this in the myriad ways we have access to, keep alive and reference all modes of knowing and thinking – body, time and history and the coexistence of conflicting possibilities. The logic of our unconscious life and the staging of these many modes of knowing take place in our dreams.

Thirdly, the mind while bodily based and informed/coextensive is not limited to the restrictions of the actual body. Phantasy lies at the interface of what is and what is imaginatively possible. In their book, *Quixotic Desire*, Ruth el Saffar and Diana de Armas Wilson say the following: “... dreams are the paradigm of all the brave stratagems of our needs and desires”. (el Saffar and de Armas Wilson,

1993, p. 77) Biology as destiny as an explanation for the place of the body, is a poor epithet, because "...biology alone cannot explain the content either of cultural fantasy or private eroticism (Chodorow, 1992, p. 273) In other words, if you can accept Freud's premise that sexuality encompasses all of the sensations of the bodily organs, even as an individual strives towards genital organization, the imaginative and unconscious component of our development as a person, precludes the following: the exclusive use of our bodies as reproductive, the experience of pleasure as purely genital, and finally, biology as a fixed given that remains uninfluenced by an individual's life.

Next, we must remember that self states contain and express relational experiences – our objects are both inner and outer. We are not confined by reality in our capacity to repeat and create anew our relationships. These remain unfixed and changeable even as we relate to a particular other – therapist, friend, client or partner. In a footnote in *The Ego and the Id* (1923) a passage from a correspondence between Freud and Fleiss was added. Freud wrote "... I am accustoming myself to regarding every sexual act as an event between four individuals". (Freud, 1923, fn p. 373) While Freud was specifically referring to the bisexuality of both participants, I believe that we are also involving the relational presence of others. When we think of our capacity to dissociate – we may not always be alone.

Finally, sexuality is a psychodynamic creation and a provisional proposition. Sexuality is not an end product; it is the ongoing aliveness of our transference and counter-transference recapitulations, our various object-relations, defensive organizations, our conflicts and self structures. Psychodynamic, as the term insists, is not a static arrangement. Rather, sexuality is labile, subject to repression or dissociation, available and capable of a disappearing act, and often outside of voluntary or conscious control. Why is this important? As therapists, when we sit with another person, the presentations of their sexualities can be as fleeting as watching a rapid slide show. Just when we feel we have something stable and complete, our clients will change our mind for us.

Adrienne Harris described it like this: "...there may be multiple genders or embodied selves."⁴ For some individuals ... gendered experiences may feel integrated, ego-syntonic. For others, the gender contradictions and alternatives seem dangerous and frightening and so are maintained as splits in the self, dissociated part-objects. Any view of sex, object choice, or gender that grounds these phenomena as categories of biology or "the real" misses the heart of Freud's radical intervention in our understanding of personality. Biologically determined theories keep such experiences as gender and sexuality outside the system of meaning itself. To be meaningful, these experiences must be understood as symbolized. Gender, ..., and the relation of gender to love object

⁴ More than one gender – See for example: Blackwood, E. (1984) "Sexuality and Gender in certain Native American Tribes: The Case of cross Gender Females". *Signs: Journal of Women and Culture and Society*, 19, 27-42. Or, Ortner, S., Whitehead, H. (1981) *Sexual Meanings: The Cultural construction of gender and sexuality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

can be understood only by acts of [personal] interpretation". (Harris, 1999, p. 212-213)

Personal interpretation and interpretation as part of the dialogic exchange in psychotherapy are other useful tenets. Transference and counter-transference are forms of communication. If transference is the showing of a certain kind of information by our clients, their thoughts and experiences that may not yet be worded; then counter-transference is our receptive organ. It is the means by which we hear through direct experience what our clients are trying to show us. In the ways that we hold those experiences, think about them and lend them words; and in the ways that we help people word their own experiences, the density of their unconscious and conscious elaborations are brought into the realm of language.

This is Philip Bromberg, quoting Harry Stack Sullivan: "... syntactic symbols are best illustrated by words that are consensually validated. A consensus has been reached when the infant or child has learned the precisely right word for a situation, a word which means not only what it is thought to mean by the mothering one, but also means that to the infant". (Bromberg, 1998, p. 41)

The connections between thoughts and words and language rest on the experience that develops between the therapist and client. That experience is sensitive to the unconscious imagery and object worlds of both parties.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE

Another useful tenet is Freud's development of the concept of *Nachträglichkeit*. Freud used this concept to explain how time works unconsciously. It can be roughly translated as deferred action. It connects an early significant event with its later reinvestment with understanding and meaning. I think of it more as the deferred "real"ization of felt experience registered through the body and the imagination. We often take our understanding to be moving us forwards. What if understanding ricochets backwards through experiences that could only dimly be perceived at the time that they were occurring; so that we understand now what has lain dormant waiting to be reanimated by attention and imagination. I think perhaps knowledge and understanding can move backwards and memory itself is cast forwards in time waiting to be captured and integrated into the present.

I think this might be what Mark Slouka, in an article titled "The Arrow and the Wound" is hinting at when he quotes Franz Kafka: "the arrows fit exactly in the wounds" for which they were intended. (Slouka, 2003) Memory is not a still thing. We think of memory as being about past events and often that is true. But, what about memory that waits to be remembered? - waits patiently and quietly until some fresh event calls it from its depths and launches it into our current life. That arrow comes singing into the present seeking the target for which it was created, and the target itself calls to the arrow signalling the way. Psyche and imagination reshape the experience. Sexuality is such a target.

What does this mean for gender and sexual orientation? When we later come to talk about the various dimensions of self experience and what we mean by a unitary sense of self or a core gender identity or a sexual orientation – we are going to have to think about the constant revision and change that our self is regularly experiencing. How do we maintain a sense of our self as continuous in time and yet capable of change? As psychotherapists we can not really believe in a static sense of self if we are hoping to help people begin to integrate aspects of themselves that they have not been able to be aware of or express - except perhaps dissociatively, and integrate. If we are also hoping to help an individual find some ground on which to be able to think about their own states, we are going to have to tolerate that a person can exist in more than one self state at a time, can perhaps occupy more than one gender at different times, can perhaps identify themselves as a lesbian or queer and then get married to a man and have a child with him and still think of herself as lesbian or queer. If gender and sexual orientation form the expression of our sexuality, they carry within them all of the possible experiences and solutions that we arrived at in our childhood, adolescence and adulthood.

And when we are talking about the Oedipal complex here today or thinking about it with out therapists or our clients, we are not talking about an isolated and discrete event fixed in time. We are talking about multiple experiences that over

time are revitalized and re-alized during new domains of developmental capacities and through new relationships. Time really does change everything.

Now, in order to continue we also need to reconsider what psychodynamic theories are. Throughout this year and our training – we study theories; and if you are in this training program it is with some understanding that no one theory works with everyone. In fact no one theory works with one person. But what is the purpose of theory? This matters, because as I go on you are going to hear several theories and theorists speak about gender and sexual orientation. Which do you use, which do you believe, how do you integrate conflicting theoretical perspectives? We need multiple theoretical orientations – but why?

This is Emmanuel Ghent (Credo, 1989, p. 206):

“Any given theory provides a more or less secure scaffolding on which to register one’s perceptions, and build one’s conceptions; at the same time, the theory by its very nature is limiting and constrictive, so that other forces in the form of new observations, new ideas, new techniques, new influences from other disciplines are constantly impinging on the theory and aiming at its expansion, or ultimately, at its replacement by a better theory”. In other words a theory should have an element of planned obsolescence about it. It’s a bit like that unpleasant realization we have when we buy a car or a computer – this too will be out of date.

You can hear this echoed in these comments by Christopher Bollas (Bollas, 2007, p. 82-83)

“A theory (emphasis added) is a metasensual phenomenon. It allows one to see something not seen by other theories; to have as an unconscious possibility should clinical need for it to arise.” (Bollas, 2007, p. 82)

“Psychoanalysts need to learn all the theories they can so that they may become unconscious perception-structures enabling practitioners to participate more deeply in the psychoanalytic experience. The analysand’s unconscious will sense the range of the perceptive receptiveness of the psychoanalyst”. (Bollas, 2007, p. 82)

“If theory is perception, if it indicates an ethics of practice, it also serves as a sign of the limits of consciousness. However much a theory presumes to tell us something about a person, its actual function is less in what it discovers than in how it sees.” (Bollas, 2007, p. 83)

And finally let us return to Freud:

“..we become aware of a state of things which also confronts us in many other instances in which light has been thrown by psycho-analysis on a mental

process. [we might ask here which mental process – those of the client or those of the psycho- analytic process of thinking] So long as we trace the development from its final outcome backwards, the chain of events appears continuous, and we feel we have gained insight which is completely satisfactory or even exhaustive. But if we proceed the reverse way, if we start from the premise inferred from the analysis and try to follow these up to the final result, then we no longer get the impression of an inevitable sequence of events which could not have been otherwise determined. We notice at once that there might have been another result, and that we might have been just as well able to understand and explain the latter. The synthesis is thus not so satisfactory as the analysis; in other words, from a knowledge of the premise we could not have foretold the nature of the result.” (Freud, 1920, p. 167)

In a later paper Freud would express it like this:

“... there is the further problem of whether we are to suppose that the process invariably follows the same course, or whether a great variety of different preliminary stages may not converge upon the same terminal situation.” (Freud, 1925, p. 251)

What I think Freud might be hinting at here is that from the position we are in as therapists: when we are acting as if we are with a category – heterosexual, homosexual, perversity or just plain sexuality - we can work our way back

seamlessly to an aetiology, but if we start with a person and work our way forward in time, there is more than one route to their end result. In fact several paths may converge on that end point.

So this brings me to a final tenet. It isn't Freud's, it is mine. Actually, I came across a reference to it in a book called *Lesbian Lives*. This tenet is called the "Lesbian Rule". This is what it looks like. I have introduced this once before. I have this from my studies at OCAD. Now, I understand that bigger is better, or is that longer is better? So I was in an art store and came across this version – it even has marks so that you can measure how long something is. This allows you to join points together that do not lie on a straight line. It's used by architects and designers and carpenters. It is defined in the OED as a "principle allowing flexibility". The OED (1989) gives examples of how the term was used in the 17th century "a principle of judgment that is pliant and accommodating, ...[it] plies to the work, not forc'th the work to it ... that goes not by a straight rule, but by a leaden Lesbian rule". (Magee and Miller, 1997)

Why is this good for us as psychotherapists? No one we will ever meet in our work is "straight". They did not arrive at their current position in life by following a preordained developmental line or by deviating from one, and we cannot determine their struggle by reference to some set of points or coordinates. The more flexible we are in our attention, and by attention I mean our capacity to hold multiple sets of theoretical coordinates, or as Bollas suggested – metasensual

phenomena, the more able we are to understand our client's experience. They actually arrive in our offices by paths we don't know. Our theories really are a scaffolding to help us perceive and think. I presented a very different version of this lecture in 2000. At the end of that lecture I said that our theories function like a kite. Where we stand allows the kite a certain radius of movement. If we want to enlarge that radius we have to have more than one theoretical point on which to stand.

Why am I drawing on these reflections regarding the purpose of theoretical perspectives? Depending on the opening questions that we ask and the expected ends we believe we will encounter – we construct our thinking, direct our capacity to listen and bend our receptive unconscious – in the direction of our clients.

Let's review the stages of psychosexual development as set out by Freud. More particularly I am referring to the pre-oedipal and oedipal periods. When we come later to discuss sexuality, it will be important to remember some of the things Freud said about our earlier sexual development, which includes the oral and anal periods of our life. The various channels along which our libido flows from the very beginning are related to each other "like interconnecting pipes". (Freud, 1905, fn p. 63). Sexual excitation is derived "not from the so called sexual parts alone, but from all of the bodily organs". (Freud, 1905, p.139). Our sexual excitation arises as a byproduct of a large number of processes that occur in the

organism, digestion, bowel movements, sucking and ingesting, as soon as they reach a certain degree of intensity. In addition, any relatively powerful emotion, even though it is of a distressing nature itself, will be experienced as an excitation. Rage is a form of arousal and while it may not be pleasurable it is an excitation within the body. (Freud, 1905, p. 157) These bodily processes, terror, rage or aggression, for example, can result in excitations that may tip over into arousal that is sometimes difficult to discern from a more typical sexual arousal.

When Freud started outlining psychosexual development he believed from the outset that psychoanalysis considers that the “choice of an object independently of its sex – [the] freedom to range equally over male and female objects ... is the original basis from which, as a result of a restriction in one direction or the other, both the normal and the inverted types develop”. (Freud, 1905, fn p. 57) This is our human birthright, to be able to range freely. I believe at that point for Freud normal and inverted were not evaluative terms but references to the manner in which the child traverses the intricacies of the oedipal drama. Freud went on to say that a person’s “final sexual attitude is not decided until after puberty and is the result of a number of factors, not all of which are yet known; some are of a constitutional nature and some are accidental ... the multiplicity of determining factors is reflected in the variety of manifest sexual attitudes” actually present in human kind. (Freud, 1905, fn p. 57) In the course of our childhood and potentially in varying degrees in our adult life Freud believed that in “all of us, throughout life, the libido normally oscillates between male and female objects”.

(Freud, 1920, p. 158) And finally, Freud stated that the libido is invariably and necessarily of a masculine nature, whether it occurs in men or in women and irrespectively of whether its object is a man or a woman". (Freud, 1905, p. 158) Please remember back to the beginning of our conversation to the distinction we made between what we might mean by masculine and feminine, and what Freud meant.

These are some of the rich theoretical scaffolding that Freud began to think with. They are important as part of the structure on which Freud builds, and I think in some instances loses sight of as part of his theoretical plan. He will say at some point that a linear presentation is not a very adequate means of describing complicated mental processes going on in different layers of the mind. (Freud, 1920, p. 160).

Several years ago I went to an art installation piece at the AGO. In a room there were about twenty-five speakers set up. Some in pairs, groupings of four or more and some solitarily set apart. The experience was to walk through the room and listen to the voices coming out of the speakers. You could be caught in a conversation, walk several feet and hear it repeated, hear a completely disparate conversation going on somewhere else in the room, circle around and hear a gaggle of voices you couldn't separate out into individual speech and then take another step and hear a solitary voice of indiscriminate gender. Some of

the voices were crisp while others were whispered. The cumulative effect was disorienting.

The human endeavor is to try and locate oneself solidly somewhere with someone. When this clarity is refused or disrupted the cascade of possibilities is deafening. We reach for clarity of some sort, we reach for order; and while we change we also reach for continuity. So bear this in mind as I attempt to gather in a linear fashion, what Freud was saying across eight papers from 1905 through to 1933. More importantly, bear this in mind when I am trying to talk about a child traversing multiple relational conversations, bumping up against refusals, invitations, mixed messages and parental confusions; and trying to locate him or herself somewhere with someone and trying not to lose all of the possibilities that are also his or her birthright.

Let us start with the pre-oedipal boy. While Freud stated that not as much was known about this period in the boy's development, he did think that in the pre-history of the O.C. there was an identification of an affectionate sort by the boy with his father. (Freud, 1925, p. 250) Identifications become important experiences in any child's development.

The phallic phase is contemporaneous with the O.C. for the boy. (Freud, 1924, p.174) By phallic I mean genitally active but not yet genitally organized. This is the third stage of psychosexual development following the oral and anal stages

and preceding the latency and genital stages. During this period the possibility of castration enters the boy's awareness from various sources and is also denied as a possibility. Castration is first understood as loss alongside numerous other losses, not necessarily only the loss of the penis – loss of parental attention, loss of the breast, loss of control over the freedom of one's own bowel movements. Loss of his penis is not yet easily considered. At some point and in some way his disbelief in the possibility of the loss of his own organ becomes an untenable position, he must come to recognize that the threat of castration is a real possibility. Freud suggested that the sight of the female genitals brings this realization solidly and substantially home to the boy.

In writing this I remembered a scene from *The Silence of the Lambs*. A fortyish man is standing naked in front of a video camera and a mirror. The camera angle is such that the viewer sees the man as the camera does. The man stands looking at his genitals, which are out of sight of the viewer and then he takes them and pushes them out of sight between his thighs. He turns to view himself and then dances into view. Visually and seamlessly he has made his genitals disappear. There is the vestige of several folds in his skin remarkably like the vaginal folds in a young girl. The near invisibility of any genital hair heightens the impression of a very young girl's genitalia. It is a compelling and disturbing moment in the movie.

SHOW VIDEO CLIP – Silence of the Lambs – Buffalo Bill Dancing - ask for responses

When the loss of his own penis finally becomes imaginable the threat of castration that he has held in his imagination for some time takes its “deferred effect” on the boy’s attention. (Freud, 1924, p. 176). The little boy has now entered the Oedipal complex. and there are two possibilities of satisfaction open to him, “an active and a passive one” or in Freud’s other terminology, a normal and an inverted one.

The boy could put himself in father’s place in a masculine fashion and turn his desires towards his mother as father did, in which case he would experience his father as a hindrance; or he might want to take the place of his mother and be loved by his father, in which case mother would be in the way. (Freud, 1924, p. 176) The possibility and recognition of castration puts an end to both of these options. To be with father is to give up his penis in order to be with father as mother is, and to be with mother is to risk the loss of his penis by dint of threat from his father. This is Freud’s construction of the boy’s dilemma which I will return to later on. The boy will turn away from both parents. When his object-cathexes are given up they are replaced by identifications with the father. These identifications are introjected into the ego and form the nucleus of the super-ego. The libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipal Complex are desexualized and

sublimated. They are further inhibited in their aim by being changed into affectionate impulses.

The Oedipal Complex must be destroyed completely. If only a measure of repression is achieved, then the complex persists in the unconscious and will manifest itself later in life. (Freud, 1924, p. 176-177)

Pause – comments – questions?

As Freud approaches his discussion of the girl's development he reminds us again that the Oedipal Complex for boys also has a double orientation, both active and passive in accordance with his bisexual disposition. He may want to take his mother's place as the love object of the father, or he may want to take the father's place and love the mothers as father does. (Freud, 1925, p. 250)

Freud discovered through analysis that the prehistory of the oedipal complex for the girl is lengthy and that the Oedipal Complex is actually a secondary formation for her. (Freud, 1925, p. 251) In "boys the Oedipal Complex is destroyed by the castration complex in girls it is made possible and led up to by the castration complex". In other words, for the girl the Oedipal Complex is created by an already accomplished event – by the understanding that she is castrated.

(Freud, 1925, p. 256 – emphasis original)

There are two challenges in understanding female development. The young girl must accomplish two tasks that do not face the boy, she must find a way to give up her leading genital organ – her clitoris, and she must give up her first love object – her mother. (Freud, 1931, p. 225) During the pre-oedipal period masturbation and clitoral activity are masculine activities that must be given up in order for the development of femininity to occur. (Freud, 1925, p. 255) The girl can only reach a normal positive Oedipal Complex after she has surmounted the negative complex.

From this you can see that both the positive and negative complex appear more co-extensive in the boy during the Oedipal Complex while in the girl the negative complex is pre-oedipal and once overcome the girl enters the positive Oedipal Complex. The girl's sexual development is thus divided into two phases, the first is masculine in character and only the second is specifically feminine. (Freud, 1931, p. 228) In other words, "to the change in her own sex there must correspond a change in the sex of her object". (Freud, 1931, p. 228)

In effect, with the acknowledgement of her castration, three potential lines of development open up for the girl.

Out of dissatisfaction with her small clitoris the girl will give up her active masculine sexuality, give up phallic clitoral activity and with it parts of her masculinity in other areas as well. (Freud, 1931, p. 229) Or, if she clings to a

hope and desire for a penis and maintains the phantasy of being a man she will return to a masculine complex which can result in manifest homosexuality. (Freud, 1931, p. 230) And finally, if by a “circuitous path” she takes her father as her love object she will find her way to the feminine form of the Oedipal Complex.

What turns the girl from her mother and towards her father is multi fold. Femaleness suffers some depreciation with the smallness of the clitoris, disappointment with herself and with her mother, and the eventual symbolic equation of the penis with a baby that she can obtain from her father. If the girl cannot give up her masculine activity she is locked into the position of envy and humiliation, so she enters the Oedipal complex as one who enters a “haven of refuge” from the painful consequences of her genital shortcomings. (Freud, 1932, p. 129)

The motive however, for the destruction of the Oedipal Complex – the threat of castration - is missing and so her super ego development is not as strong as the boys. She does not identify with the father as the boy does.

Eventually, like the boy, they must both relinquish their parents as sexual objects and turn towards the larger world.

It is important to get the sense of Freud’s theoretical structures as he set them out. Once we have them clear we have to figure out what we can do with them.

It isn't necessary to completely throw them out – we have to be able to allow them to inform us and become revised, and we have to be able to recognize those aspects of the theory that no longer serve or have become obsolete.

It took me a while, despite numerous readings of Freud's papers, to piece these stories together. Not because they are unclear but because the reverberations of each step by either child through the oedipal situation is deafening in its possibilities. It will be our purpose throughout the rest of the day to try to hear further what these other possible reverberations are.

Freud never said anything simply, he thought on the fly and suggested much more than he simply said. He revised as he wrote, and if Freud was complex, then the voices that have joined the conversation since Freud have trenched on Freud's theories and as Ghent, quoted earlier said – aimed at their expansion. Some of those voices include: Adrienne Harris, Judith Butler, Jessica Benjamin, Maggie Magee and Diana Miller, Ken Corbett, Hans Loewald, Adam Phillips, Christopher Bollas, Jonathan Lear, Thomas, Ogden, Lewis Aron and on.

In reading and preparing for this lecture, several writers have commented on the loss of interest and conversation about sexuality within psychoanalysis. Our school has in a sense responded to this concern by joining in a conversation aimed at revitalizing theories of sexuality. So, in the tradition that is psychodynamic, I am going to free associate for the rest of the day. I am aiming

at a conversation between Freud, these other multiple theoretical voices and my own.

A child must navigate and acquire a sense of gender and sexual orientation and they must develop what Freud called an “erotic sense”. (Bollas, 2000, p. 29)

She or he does this in relationship to their parents. Family constellations today are: single parent – of either gender, parents of both genders, and same sexed parents – also of either gender.

Yet no matter what the family arrangement is, one comes to see oneself as male or female and being masculine and feminine, and as having an erotic life that ranges over internal and external objects of both genders. That is a considerable range of motion and potential for each individual.

So, let us circle back into Freud's ideas by integrating some of the current clinical and theoretical extensions.

Let's start with a question first – What is the purpose of the Oedipal Complex? Not the theory, but the experiential process of it.

In one sense it is to help a child move from an auto-erotic into an allo-erotic sexual life.

In another sense, it is to help the child, through their sensual experiences and multiple identifications, to form a sense of how to relate to a larger world as an agent in that world.

As an agent a child develops a capacity for self reflection through the development of a sense of subjectivity and as a subject the ability to hold the self as an object of consideration. This is the foundation for self-reflectivity.

In yet another sense, it helps the child establish a sense of their gender as related to how they claim, inhabit and move in their own body.

Also, it helps the child orient their sexuality to those others for whom they feel an erotic attachment and from whom they feel a welcoming response.

Finally, it teaches a child to hold out for a future by tolerating the pressures and frustrations of a present without relapsing into erotic withdrawal.

Both Adrienne Harris (Multiple Selves, Multiple Codes)⁵ and Philip Bromberg (Standing in the Spaces The Multiplicity of Self and Psychoanalytic Relationship)⁶ argue from the perspective that there are non-linear developmental paths along which individuals develop and often multiple self

⁵ Harris, Adrienne. *Gender as Soft Assembly*. 2005, London: The Analytic Press.

⁶ Bromberg, Philip. *Standing in the Spaces*. 1998, London: The Analytic Press.

states from which within which a person lives. Developmental paths intersect and self states must learn to communicate in order for an individual to live well.

Maggie Magee and Diana Miller quote a passage from Virginia Woolf's *Orlando*:

[T]hese selves of which we are built up, one on top of another, as plates are piled on a waiter's hand, have attachments elsewhere, sympathies, little constitutions and rights of their own, call them what you will (and for many of these things there is no name) so that one will only come if it is raining, another in a room with green curtains, another when Mrs. Jones is not there, another if you promise it a glass of wine – and so on; for everybody can multiply from its own experience the different terms which his different selves have mad with him – and some are too widely ridiculous to be mentioned in print at all. (*Orlando* 201-202)(Magee and Miller, 2002, p. 209)

I have a self that will only show up for lectures if I promise it a martini later on.

Psychosexuality is in fact one path of development that can look something like this (Lesbian Rule), and if I could interweave this with several other developmental paths occurring at the same time – I might in fact have something that looked more like this (Bev's toy), because these points touch upon and redirect each other. Because there are many different developmental paths occurring simultaneously, these moments when they intersect act like the nodal points of Freud's concept of the unconscious.

Several years ago Bev showed me her Hoberman sphere and I have been coveting it ever since. While I was writing this talk I remembered her sphere and asked if I could borrow it for today. Bev reminded me that part of the beauty of

this sphere is that it can expand or contract in all directions. This seemed to me an apt symbol of the human psyche and our capacity to move out into and withdraw from the world. I kept the sphere in my office and between sessions I played with it. There is something so enormously physically pleasing in this activity that I had to go out and buy one of my own. Please feel free to try it later on if you'd like.

In a recent conversation with a student – on an entirely different topic, several of us were discussing how to order different types of equally important information. This student said a most helpful thing – she suggested we had to find a way to present all the types of information first. I have been wondering since then how I can do that today. Our unconscious can build a network of connections between many and variously important ideas by creating a dream in which to situate the dreamer. Many things in a dream can be shown at once. But when we awake we have to try to tell the dream in a more or less linear way and after the fact to associate back to the many interconnected points in the dream. The development of gender and sexual orientation and our erotic life is like this (Bev's toy), though I can still only show you one section at a time.

We will several times today return to the Oedipal complex in order to expand upon the many intersecting developmental lines that touch upon and redirect sexuality. There is a lot going on in a child from birth to seven, which covers our pre-oedipal and oedipal period.

So, let's approach it again.

In your readings during the lecture cycles you will be learning through the study of Daniel Stern that a child's experience of the world is multi-modal and multiply configured. His theory of RIGs describes a picture of the developing child as a "constructive, transformative participant" (Harris, 2005, p. 29) in complex interactions that will vary with "context, co-participant and setting". (Harris, 2005, p. 29) RIGs are Representations of Interactions that have become Generalized, or more plainly, this is the preverbal infant's capacity to gather experiences and distill them into an average prototype which can act as a basic building block for the core self. (Stern, 1985, p. 97-98) What is an interesting and useful elaboration of the concept of a RIG is the concept of an "evoked companion". When the infant experiences several roughly similar episodes of a type of interaction with a "self-regulating" other, there is the formation of a RIG. When next in a similar episode some of the attributes of that episode will evoke from within that RIG an activated other or the "evoked companion". This companion is an "experience of being with, or in the presence of, a self regulating other, which may occur in or out of awareness". (Stern, 1985, p. 111-112)

[RIG is a representation of averaged past experiences from which a memory can be evoked]

Hold this idea for a moment.

Let us add to this Stern's theory of amodal and cross-modal perception. Stern defines amodal perception as the capacity "to take information received in one sensory modality and somehow translate it into another sensory modality".

(Stern, 1985, p. 51) Infants and toddlers, in fact human beings, live in a world of perceptual unity. (Examples, hum, tap chest, wag head) The sound, skin pressure and proprioceptors share a common intensity, duration and rhythm – they have a perceptual unity – which both you and I can perceive. Something in the integrity of those sensations allows me to translate across different modalities of perception and allows you to share that experience. We can "perceive amodal qualities in any modality from any form of human expressive behavior, represent these qualities abstractly, and then transpose them to other modalities". (Stern, 1985, p. 51)

Hold this one with the first idea of a RIG.

And let us add one more component.

Stern states that in our earliest formed sense of self: "there must be some organization that is sensed as a reference point. The first such organization concerns the body: its coherence, its actions, its inner feeling states, and the memory of all these. That is the experiential organization with which the sense of a core self is concerned". (Stern, 1985, p. 46)

Now let us try and put these together with regard to sexuality.

The organization of our earliest experiences of self, other and self-with-other, comes to us through multiple modes of perception, which we can then transpose into other modalities of understanding. From these multiple pathways we also have the capacity to generalize and use these generalizations as reference points from which we can call up the other as a regulating or dis-regulating companion. Our developing sense of core self is rooted in these organizing experiences. All of these experiences are registered through the body and throughout development are available for imaginative elaboration.

This is a picture of the infant moving through the oral and anal phase into the phallic phase of the oedipal complex. The way that infant is held, fed, played with, spoken to and cleaned; the infant's experiences of the bodily presence of the other – their softness, texture, musculature, rigidity or warmth; the body as part-objects – fingers, openings, nipples, lips and gaps; these will become part of a system of self, sameness, difference and relationship. Same and different will not be restricted to genitals.

It what is now famously called the embodied mind or the minded body; we must also consider the child's growing capacity for self-reflection. Fonagy and Target have elaborated what is called "the interpersonal interpretive mechanism". The capacity of the child for self-reflection and awareness of others as separate

minds is directly linked to their embedded-ness in the capacity of those others to think about the child as a separate and developing individual.

Fonagy and Target describe it as follows: “Our acceptance of a dialectical perspective on self-development shifts the traditional psychoanalytic emphasis from internalization of the containing object to the internalization of the thinking self from within the containing object ...”. (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, Target, 2004, p. 288)

In a subtle nuance, I believe Fonagy and Target would also point out that the other mind that presents itself to the nascent thinker; would have to be a safe place to visit. (Fonagy, 1999, p. 4-5; 1999, 7) If as Fonagy and Target further suggest, we develop through “internalization of the thinking self from within the containing object ...” (Bromberg, 1998, p. 10; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, Target, 2004, p. 288), then how a child comes to think about their bodies, other bodies and the way those bodies can get together, or be refused, the sense of being warmly welcomed or sharply rejected, is pivotal to a child’s developing sense of how they are gendered and how they move towards or away from other gendered bodies.

Philip Bromberg describes it thus: “The child’s experience of “me-ness” ... is most sturdy when his states of mind are experienced and reflected upon by the mind of an other, particularly during moments of intense affective arousal. ... If

the other's behavior, even if it is not fully welcoming, shows that his state of mind is emotionally and cognitively responsive to what is most affectively immediate in the child's mind rather than tangential to it ... the engagement constitutes an act of recognition that allows the child to accomplish the developmental achievement of taking his own state of mind as an object of reflection." (Bromberg, 1998, p. 10)

Recognition is a very fine word. Recognition helps to create an internal world of thought and sensory experience where both parties, the child and the adult, turn their attention towards the emergent capacity of the child to hold onto their own worlds and words. When we come later to discuss the experiences of same and opposite-sexed children in the expression of their desires towards both parents – recognition and acceptance will be important in the way that child experiences and allows the development elaboration of their own erotic sense.

Those aspects of self-experience that can not be thought or thought about can not be integrated into a sense of self. The creative dimension of dissociation or splitting, is that splitting also preserves a reserved space apart from dyadic and triadic relating, in which the child can maintain room for self-reflection. That that self-reflection is not yet integrated into conscious awareness or that it resides at a level of awareness not easily available for future relational deployment, may be the task of later development or therapy.

Both gender and sexual orientation, in addition to their conscious contingent, can also act as carriers for many disowned or disavowed self states. Gender and sexual orientation can become generalized experiences or RIGs from within which we call up our experiences with others across our developmental life span.

To continue a bit with reflective functioning, Adrienne Harris discusses the idea of metacognition. This is a form of knowing, variations on not knowing, consciousness and self consciousness that develops through the social experience of being known, spoken to and thought about. This adds another register to Freud's levels of subjectivity: unconscious, pre-conscious, conscious and now also metaconscious. The social world lends shape to the later two. This is not unlike being "thought about, felt about, and imagined" characteristic of Fonagy and Target's theory of mentalization described earlier. (Harris, 2005, p. 4)

While a child is initially in the world of the primary care giver, moving there as one who is regularly sheltered under a large colorful umbrella that is periodically shared with the other parent, in actual fact that child is always also in a larger world of others. Our earliest dyadic and triadic relationships are contextualized by a larger social world. The pressures and supports that hold the parent or parents also hold the child. Winnicott hinted at this when he suggested that the father protects and preserves the primary maternal care that the mother invests

in. If we enlarge that circle, the manner in which the parents are held socially also affects their capacity to be recognized, thought about, imagined and known.

For example, I have worked with lesbian parents trying to find a way to bring their child into the social world of school. How these parents are held by the school surround becomes the environment for their child's experience. I have also worked with teachers trying to find ways of bringing gay parents into the culture of the school or trying to teach boys and girls how to be less preoccupied with limiting their experience of themselves as they negotiate what it means to be male or female. How these teachers think about their students is the experiential surround that those students will develop socially within. I have been a teacher in an alternative school, trying to find a way for a transsexual student to feel comfortable in something as simple as which set of bathrooms they can safely use and; how could we make the student population sensitive and also safe in that experience.

So as we think about gender and sexual orientation we are considering a child whose psychosexual development is occurring along multiple and intersecting lines of development – bodily awareness, awareness of self, other and self with other, a developing capacity for self reflection, the acquisition of language, aspects of self that are in and out of awareness and subject to varying degrees of dissociation, and the self embedded in the larger contextual world of the family and social life.

Bearing all of these in mind, shall we now try to rethink how one becomes gendered and oriented? Let's begin again.

Freud derived his theory of bisexuality from biological sources. Bisexuality was a potential inherent in cells, tissues, organs and organisms. (Stoller, 1974, p. 391; Freud, 1920, p. 171)

The theories of bisexuality that Freud developed from this biological foundation are fruitful, complicated and sometimes misused. In several of Freud's papers (Freud, 1931, SE, 21; 1933a [1932], SE, 22), he presented his belief that bisexuality involves, in every human being, a more or less congruent and accepted amalgamation of masculine and feminine traits, "every individual ... displays a mixture of the character-traits belonging to his own and the opposite sex; and he shows a combination of activity and passivity whether these last character-traits tally with his biological ones". (Freud, 1905, fn p. 142) We are capable, each of us, of integrating these aspects of masculinity and femininity. What Freud describes as the girl's earliest sense of phallic activity during the pre-oedipal stage is part of her bisexual disposition, and what Freud describes as a boy's desire to be with father as mother is during the oedipal complex, is part of his bisexual disposition. We can still hear in Freud the sense of tying particular traits to a particular biology.

This is an excerpt from *Smilla's Sense of Snow*. It is I think an example of the extraordinary capacity of our unconscious life to come into view periodically.

This is Smilla's thoughts and sexuality:

He has a light fumbling brutality, which several times makes me think that this time it'll cost me my sanity. In our dawning, mutual intimacy, I induce him to open the little slit in the head of his penis so I can put my clitoris inside and fuck him. (Hoeg, 1995, p.195)

Our gender, active/passive, masculine/feminine, is much more fluid and nuanced than our genitalia would indicate. While our biological sex will eventually be congruent with our felt sense of our gender; our unconscious life, our shifting associations and our dreams show us that we retain a psychic bisexuality that relates to the integration and fluctuations in our ongoing sense of our masculinity and femininity.

We use a binary system of male and female to make sense of and lay claim to our gender. Our culture contributes to the content of what masculinity and femininity are. If I asked you – you could probably tell me what “masculinity” and “femininity” is, and the “ “, act as qualifiers – like saying – I know this is a stereotype, but. This, “ “, is an essentially empty set. What is important about gender and gender identity is that it is what an individual lays claim to and how they occupy their felt sense of being a man or woman. My sense of being a woman flows from what my mother's sense of herself as a woman was, what it meant to her to be with a daughter who was and was not like her. In relationship

to my father it is embedded in the ways that he could and could not relate to me as his little girl and as a child who was and was not like him. My gender is comprised of what I accepted, rejected, elaborated and laid claim to as part of how I became a woman, and how that sense changes over time still. How I expressly live it is what my gender, my femininity, is. What it is will differ for each of us. Who I am with at any given moment also changes how I experience myself. When I am with some women I sometimes feel I don't belong to the club. (examples) Femininity or masculinity is not a category or a condition – it's a being.

What Freud also seemed to mean by bisexuality was inversion or homosexuality. In an extended footnote in his *Three Essays On the Theories of Sexuality* (1905), Freud developed his ideas on bisexuality to include the realization that “all human beings are capable of making a homosexual object-choice” (Freud, 1905, fn p. 56), psychoanalysis considers the “choice of an object independently of its sex – [the] freedom to range equally over male and female objects” (Freud, 1905, fn p. 57) and that in “all of us, throughout life, the libido normally oscillates between male and female objects”. (Freud, 1920, p. 158)

In this understanding of bisexuality Freud is using the word with a very different connotation. There is an important and significant difference between bisexuality as our capacity to integrate masculine and feminine components into our psychic repertoire, as “having it all”; and bisexuality as our ability to allow our libido to

range over male and female objects, of “wanting it all”. These both occur interpersonally – which is one thing, and intrapsychically – which is a very different thing.

The relationship of a couple, as with Smilla, brings forward their capacity to hold and express their own bisexuality and their ability to tolerate the ambivalence also needed to make room for the other’s bisexuality as well. In the area of play between two individuals we can see the openness or constrictions in their own early dyadic and triadic relationships.

Bisexuality is the “wish to be and to have it all”, and if we don’t have it at the moment we can have it at some point. This view borders on our capacity to imaginatively and creatively refuse reality – in other words it is the action of our phantasy life. We want “male and female organs, identifications, love objects, and culturally designated gender traits”. (Aron, 1995, p. 202)

Now this is the enormous richness of Freud’s theory – potentially. In what I think of as a failure of the imagination, I believe these two ideas, the integration of masculine and feminine traits and the capacity to range over male and female objects, have been conflated theoretically resulting in a proscriptive use of Freud’s ideas; a kind of linear expectation of how a child gets from point A to B, with B acting as a predetermined terminal point. The expectations we have determine what we allow our theories to see and imagine. Remember the

passage I read earlier from Freud, he pointed out that while analysis can help us understand how a person might have arrived at their current psychic arrangement, if we develop a theory based on that analysis and then try to outline how a person will develop, we will come to see that they could have arrived at that terminal point from a number of different directions. We cannot use a conclusion to generate a theory of outcomes because we lose the particularity of each individual's life.

Freud was very clear that there are a number of paths that can converge upon the same destination, and we will have to entertain the possibility that there is more than one desirable destination available. If we can entertain the possibility that there is more than one legitimate terminal point, a B or C or D, rather than theorizing all deviations as a derailments, then we can revitalize the richness of Freud's thinking.

OK, so what would an example of this failure of the imagination look like? Let me approach this by reading an excerpt from a case history. This is an example of when two meanings for bisexuality, (identifications and erotic attachments), start to appear in the same conversation. What I have begun to realize is that we are almost always working within a heterosexual model of theory. I am not talking about heterosexual orientation now I am actually referring to the structure of the theory itself. The following excerpt is typical of some of the narrower psychoanalytic uses of Freud's theory. This article was written in 1982, and is

titled “A Developmental Line of Gender Identity, Gender Role, and Choice of Love Object” by Phyllis Tyson, J. of the American Psychoanalytic Association V.30 #1 1982).

Tyson’s premise is this: “each sex uses the primary objects (mother and father) differently, and that the availability of both is crucial for optimal development”. (p. 63) This is a problem for us as therapists. Insisting that the identification must be with the same sex parent in order to organize one’s gender, misses the way that the child is constantly in the world of the mother, and that that world is multiply gendered. Insisting that if all goes well in the choice of the opposite sex parent as a love object, misses the variability of our sexual desires and loses sight of about ten percent of the population as anything but a deviation.

Freud argued that psycho-analysis teaches us to manage with a single libido which has active and passive aims; or modes of satisfaction. This libido is not assigned a sex. (Freud, 1931, p. 240) Unless we are going to suggest that there is a male and female libido, a heterosexual male and heterosexual female libido, and a lesbian and gay male libido; we are going to have to start thinking about how the libido we all possess comes to be the organizational site of our erotic and libidinal investments in the world. We do not have six discreet libidos nor do we need them. Libido then is not a static construct; it is a landscape and a process. It doesn’t have a meaning until it gets a meaning. (consider Freud, 1920, p. 171 “when we attempt to reduce them further we find masculinity

vanishing into activity and femininity into passivity, and that does not tell us enough”)(Think back to Harris’ comments on p. 8-9 of this paper)

As we will come later to discuss, Tyson also misunderstands both forms of bisexuality as Freud outlined them, and forgets the bisexuality of both parents as well.

Let us consider the ways that children position them self with both parents and then are repositioned by parents.

This is a close reading of a passage from Tyson’s paper. It is taken from the point in the article where the author is describing the little boy’s phallic stage.

“The extent to which longing for father’s love and attention exists alongside positive oedipal wishes is not often appreciated. Boys are frequently quite vocal about their oedipal wishes towards their mother, their wish for exclusive possession of her; their intense libidinal longings are frequently evident in seductive behaviour toward mother. Nevertheless, they also wish to be like father, to be with him, and to have his attention; but the wish for the father’s companionship and the view of him as ideal should not be confused with a bisexual wish. [Which meaning of bisexuality are we being instructed about? Bisexuality here means passive feminine aims. We are being told that we are

not talking about same-sex object love but identificatory love. Identificatory love is very important and I will be talking about it later, but Tyson's intention with this comment is quite clear.] She refers to Freud (1921) and then goes on to say: "This behaviour has nothing to do with a passive or feminine attitude towards his father; it is on the contrary typically masculine" (p. 105) [The little boy wants to be a boy like dad is]. However, a homosexual partner orientation may have its roots here. The closer attachment to father may arouse bisexual wishes, in which case the father is the object of a libidinal wish that leads the boy into an exclusive relationship with him. [Technically then this is a homosexual object choice – but Tyson doesn't retain the identificatory love that engenders the boy as a boy, she reverts to the other meaning of bisexuality – the boy now has passive feminine aims]. Even so, the boy's expression of so-called "negative-oedipal" longings, in which he pictures himself as feminine and wishes to give his father a baby as his mother does, is usually short lived, for a feminine position implies the loss of his precious penis." (Tyson, 1982, p. 60)

Pause

Why would he want to give up his penis? A child of this age is overinclusive - they have everything. So why would a little boy adopt a feminine position particularly at this moment? Why would he not identify with the father and long for the father as a little boy with his penis intact - why must he be in a feminine position to be with the father? To be with can not immediately mean to be with

the opposite sex. There is a problem with the structure of the theory and there is a problem with the assumption of how the end point must be arranged.

So let's illustrate what this theory would look like with a **Diagram**:

The author goes on to offer an illustration of what the reader must assume she considers to be an appropriate reorienting of the child in both his gender and sexual orientation. The article continues:

"C., almost four, with his most erotic look, exclaimed, 'Daddy, I love you! I think I'll marry a man when I grow up.' After some discussion C. realized that if he married a man, he could not marry a woman like mommy, and could not be a daddy to a baby as his daddy was to him. Therefore he changed his mind and returned to his former wish to marry the little girl next door." (Tyson, 1982, p. 69)

What was daddy saying? Implicitly he was saying you can only have a baby if you marry a woman. What he is also saying is that to be a subject like me with a penis, identificatory love, you must position yourself with someone who does not have one. If you marry someone with a penis you must be without one and therefore you will not be like me, you will be feminine. He could have said you want to be like me, we both have a penis, we are able to care for and be a daddy for a baby and you love me as the object of your desires, some day you will want a good man like me to love. There is an inevitable collapse of gender and object

choice and escape from the complexity of possible arrangements requires reverting to the feminine in the bisexual gender equation. Otherwise the freedom to range over male and female objects disappears.

DIAGRAM

If we are always in theory repositioning the little boy into his feminine self in order to see daddy as an object choice, we are always then maintaining a heterosexual arrangement. We are also potentially doing something quite different from what the little boy might be doing with his own gender. It is true that he might be trying on gender identification with his mother in order to be with father as she might be, but is that all that can be true? It may also be true that he is identifying with father in order to consolidate his own gender and it may also be true that as a boy with a penis of his own, he may be trying dad on as a potential for future object love. But if he is trying daddy on as a love object – he is not doing so from a feminine position – he has not become a woman. There is a serious problem with this use of theory. We can not get around the requirement of heterosexuality in a theory that can not think outside of that arrangement – either in reality or as a theoretical construction.

We need to begin to consider that while the early environment is the infant's world it is not a world in complete isolation, and it is not exclusively dyadic. Into this world will enter aunts and uncles, siblings, grandparents and friends, of both

genders. This world becomes a series of ever enlarging worlds. (See recent research, Jones, 2005) Our theories must account for how a child encounters sameness and difference and we need to be very clear as to what we mean by same and different. Usually we mean same-sex or opposite-sex.

Mother and father are familiar terms in our language. Without conscious effort and attention we don't usually question their biological sex. The first caregiver is not always a woman, and the other parent is not always male. These binary arrangements no longer hold and if we build our theory based on them then the theory will not adequately encompass changing family constellations. We need to be aware of how we have conflated the gender of the roles parents play with the role itself. One of the struggles I had writing this lecture had to do with the English language. In trying to think about how to refer to the parents as something other than the mother and the father, terms which potentially immediately constructs their biological sex, the sentence structures began to get a bit cumbersome and confusing. Not that confusion is necessarily a bad thing. Mother for our purposes is not necessarily female and father is not necessarily male in terms of their roles or their placement in the child's care. The primary caregiver is understood to be the first one that a child experiences.

Freud's theory indicates that a boy raised by a woman must identify with his father and take his mother as a love object, and a girl raised by her mother must identify with her mother and take her father as a love object. All children must

encounter the other sex at some point – but the phrase at some point is important and that other sex need not be a member of the family. The oedipal triangle allows for the working out of many different developmental efforts. Many people will help the child with their gender and their orientation. You can not live in this world without encountering the other sex somewhere at some point.

If the primary caregiver is a woman then what do we do if the other parent is also a woman? The other parent is not important for their gender alone. They are important because they arrive to disrupt the first relationship between the primary caregiver and the child. In this instance the difference of this second person does not devolve to different sex. Difference also means the one who differs relationally from the first one. While infants from birth can distinguish the primary caregiver as separate in many ways, the infant and primary caregiver are mostly in a world of sameness, a complementary world of being together and sharing like preoccupations. Sameness here is also not based on biological sex. Sameness means shared world. Omnipotence and phantasy distinguish the early life of a child. A child of either sex when with the primary caregiver is in a world of shared and same purpose. The subjective-object is the primary caregiver omnipotently controlled and possessed of those qualities that are of the infant's world. This is what I mean by sameness. Winnicott describes how the infant must eventually move from object-relating to object-usage. In order for usage to occur, the object, the primary caregiver, must eventually come to exist

outside of the infant's omnipotent control; must come to be seen as other – meaning different from the self.

The subjective object will eventually become a separate object in the shared world of external reality; this often coincides with awareness of the place of the other parent.

The second parent, regardless of their sex, is different because they come from outside this same shared world of child and first caregiver. This second parent disrupts and complicates the relational world of the child. The second parent also comes to represent the outside world of other possibilities, agency and desires. Their existence symbolizes that other world that is different from the child's first shared same world.

Same and different have too easily and problematically been attached to gender. So much is missed and constricted by this failure to imagine the child as doing anything more than acquiring a gender and a sexual orientation. They are also developing a sense of agency and an erotic sense of engagement with a world larger than the one they shared with their primary caregiver.

Our theoretical language is important. Gayle uses the term the "mothering one" to refer not to the gender of this first caregiver but to the role itself. This is very helpful in extending the meaning into the role. I could call this first person "other"

and the second person, who is usually considered the father, the “other, other”. This struggle for a better terminology regularly appears in the literature. I spent a bit of time on the internet combing through online translation dictionaries. This was interesting because some languages like Dutch appear to use the same word for father, elder, parent, older and mother. Their word is Ouder.

Can you imagine what the theory would sound like if we used the same word to refer to either parent, and what would happen structurally to the theory if we couldn't tell who the boy was identifying with or loving? Ouder sounds enough like other to be functional. That was very tempting. In Finnish homeland, fatherland, motherland and mother country was a consideration, but they also used the same word.

But the language that seemed to hold the most possibility was Inuit. They have no word for mother or father. What I did come up with was a word for “the first one” and another word for the “one who arrives from afar”. Now I am an English language speaker and the structure of my thinking is guided by my culture and my language. So perhaps my searches were not sophisticated enough. But, the idea of the first one, Sivudlerk, and the one who arrives from afar, Tikitpok, carry the kind of relational experience that I am trying for here. If we do not push ourselves in these ways we will not be able to capture the multi-varied experiences of single parent and gay and lesbian parenting, and father as the primary caregiver, that our theory must also address. So when I refer to the first

caregiver as mother and the one who arrives from afar as father, you must try to bear in mind that I am trying for a language that is not yet completely free of its biological underpinning and yet our terms must be broader than our current thinking and language allows for or even imagines. This theoretical language structure or “metasensual phenomenon” does not allow us to see other possibilities.

As we explore and re-explore the oedipal experience it might be helpful to compare it to an internet search. You probably know the sequence, you arrive at a web site and as you are browsing you come across a tempting link. You follow it and at the next page there is yet another interesting link, and so on and so on and so on. By the time you’ve moved through three or four hyper links you have to search back in your history menu to remember what your starting point was. This is a useful metaphor for us because we can delve into the oedipal complex over and over again and as long as we remember that we are approaching the same topic from variously related vantage points, we will not get lost.

Thomas Ogden describes the oedipal events as occurring in a play space that he compares to Winnicott’s area of play. (Ogden, 1989, p. 138-139) I am going to liken it to the dream space so eloquently described by James Grotstein in – *Who is the Dreamer Who Dreams the Dream* (2000) and Christopher Bollas in - *At the Other’s Play, To Dream*. (Bollas, *The Shadow of the Object*, 1987, p.64-81) Both thinkers are describing the dream as the staging of occupations and

thoughts of an unconscious nature in order for the dreamer to be able to experience and think in a more conscious way. A dream provides us with something for the conscious mind to elaborate and associate to after the fact.

So it is with the oedipal experience. We are all, after the fact, trying to come to some sense of what it is that we have experienced, or for some of us – endured, after the fact. Each of us in an ongoing way – in our personal therapies, in our supervision, in our work with our own clients, is trying to piece together what this oedipal process was and is. The oedipal constellation is an enduring way of comprehending our place in the world, our agency and our relationships with others. That we can not grasp it conclusively, lay it out in a progressional way is a testament to its textured and enfolded quality. At best we grasp it one link at a time, with the continual requirement that we occasionally step back and try to remember – what question was I asking when I started out on this search.

So, to begin again, if I ask you - what is the purpose of the oedipal experience I am also going to ask you to picture it dimensionally in space, a space somewhat like the dream space in that a dream provides a place for experiences to occur within?

Let us think about a mother. The first space opens up between this mother and her little boy or girl. Freud's conception of the child as bisexual is an important feature in this area of play. It is also important to remember that the first

caregiver retains in her own unconscious identifications an equal range of bisexuality, her own history of identifications made with success or in a compromised way with her own father or other male figures. We can begin to see here that the transgenerational transmission of experience that Fonagy and Target describe is always active. Whatever mother's freedoms and constrictions are with respect to her own experiences of her body as gendered will come into play between herself and her child. We think then of this early dyad as bigendered, regardless of the actual biological sex of either participant and triadic despite the fact that it is the mother and child. The presence of a father or a potential other is always implied. (Green, Andre, 1997 p. 146-147)

Diagram

Ogden details the importance of the mother differently depending on whether the child is a girl or a boy. He points out two important qualifying features of Freud's theories.

First, Ogden points out that the disruption of relationships between a child and their mother or father would result in traumatic, angry and unsatisfying object relationships. Ogden states: if "Oedipal love is the foundation of healthy and whole-object relations" (Ogden, 1989, p. 113) then failure, defectiveness, anger and resentment are not the foundation we would wish the child to be building the

edifice of their future erotic sense on and I would argue not the scaffold on which we want to completely rest our theory.

I will remind you that the Oedipal Myth as written by Sophocles is based on Oedipus' traumatic childhood – the rejection of Oedipus by both his parents and their subsequent attempt to have him killed. In looking at that sequence of events in Oedipus' life we could employ some of Fairbairn's assertions, whom you will also meet this year right after Klein when Bev lectures. Fairbairn developed the idea that the dissonance between the mother and child early on leaves the child feeling that it is his or her way of being and loving the mother that endangers the mother to the point of her rejection and refusal of the child's early love. We may extend this to include the father's responses to the child. The child's ensuing sense is of themselves as dangerous in their loving and their desires. So, while we do not want to do away with the hatreds and envy that a child feels towards either parent, we also want to posit the possibility that there are contiguous non-traumatic ways of entering and leaving the oedipal drama.

Doris Brothers presents a similar point of view regarding sexuality as trauma. In arguing that a boy child must dis-identify from his mother, or shows disgust at the sight of the female genitals, or strictly holds a view of what masculinity is; or that a girl comes to feel shame about her clitoris and envy of the penis, or disappointment with her mother, or inadequacy; Brothers suggests that we may be seeing signs of what Kohut referred to as the “breakdown products of a

fragmenting self". (Kohut 1971, 1984; Brothers2008, p. 88; Wolf, fn 4, p121)

Rather than seeing these responses as inevitable aspects of gender identity development, we may actually be seeing signs of a troubled oedipal experience or the use of sexuality as one of the organizers of experience following an early trauma. This perspective questions the ordinary assumptions about responses from either child that are understood as a regular part of oedipal experience.

Secondly, Ogden points out that Freud's distinction between the pre-oedipal mother as an internal and part object and the oedipal mother as an external and whole object is not always clear. When we get to Melanie Klein later in this lecture we will see how she will help us elaborate this distinction between part and whole objects and internal and external worlds. Following Sharon's lectures on Freud in the lecture cycle you will be hearing about Klein's theories from Judy. In the mother's capacity to identify with her own father she sustains a psychic bisexuality that will allow her to carry these identifications in a lively way in her own internal object world. If from her own childhood experiences of relating she continues to hold these multiple positions – seeing herself as mother with father, daughter with father and herself as father with mother and father with daughter - she offers the psychic range of possibilities her own daughter needs to find in her – she holds open for her own daughter the possibility of finding father within her. This is an early world of pre-oedipal phantasy where, to use Winnicott's paradigm – one does not ask is this real or did you create it, are you my mother or my father? For Winnicott the child moves from the illusion of the "subjective object"

to the external object as independent of herself through the use of sustained paradoxes. The mother prevents the collapse of the tension between inside/outside and male/female because of her own ability to sustain ambiguity and ambivalence – the ability to hold two seemingly contradictory states in awareness, though awareness may not be conscious. As the girl moves towards the depressive position and towards oedipal relating to actual external others, this pre-oedipal mother who contains the father, acts as a transitional object or as Ogden calls it – a “dress rehearsal” for relating to the actual external father.

Within the context of the mother-daughter relationship, which is dyadic, the mother also provides her daughter with a means to enter into triadic relating through her own sustained connection to her own father, brothers, uncles and grandfathers and important male figures. I am not suggesting that the girl is never alone with mother, but that as the girl begins to register the actual presence of the father/other, mother has already prepared the way through her own retained bisexuality.

Ogden is rather strong on dialectics – reality does not move in and supersede phantasy in one big swoop of growth, rather reality enters into a relationship with phantasy in a way that allows each to create and modify the other. (Ogden, 1989, p. 117)

Ogden's elaboration and development of the pre-oedipal experience for the boy is similar and distinct in that he outlines the differences in the boy's process. Much as Freud did for the girl, Ogden describes the challenges for the pre-oedipal boy. While Freud would argue that "it is no surprise that boys retain the object" in the oedipal complex, (Freud, 1925), Ogden points out that the "Oedipal mother is and is not the same mother the little boy loved, hated, and feared prior to his discovery of her (and his father) as external Oedipal objects". (Ogden, 1989, p. 142) The nearness of the pre-oedipal mother to the later oedipal mother necessitates a different solution for the boy. The little boys "entry into an erotic and romantic relationship with the Oedipal mother is fraught with anxiety in part because she bears an uncanny resemblance to the omnipotent pre-Oedipal mother". (Ogden, 1989, p. 147)

The boy is faced with two difficulties. First, he must negotiate a discovery of the otherness of his primary caregiver – his beginning realization of her as outside and independent of him, and secondly, he faces the danger that his Oedipal romance with the mother as external object will be swallowed up by his earlier experience of her as the pre-oedipal mother. (Ogden, 1989, p. 148)

It is through his pre-oedipal relationship with his mother, a mother who again retains a bisexuality comprised of her earliest relationships with her father, that the young boy begins to acquire a phallus. Ogden distinguishes the phallus from the penis in the following way:

The little boy is born with a penis, but this is not to say he is born with a phallus. The former is an anatomical structure; the latter is a set of symbolic meanings that the boy comes to attribute to his sense of himself as a male in general, and to his psychic representation of his [own] penis in particular. It is through the development of the capacity to attribute phallic significance to himself that the little boy becomes empowered sexually. (Since a phallus and a penis are not equivalent, little girls similarly develop phallic significance for themselves in their own sense of generativity, sexual potency, power-in-the-world, and the like. (Ogden, 1989, fn 8 p. 152)

If the mother's inner object world retains a vitality and fluidity, the boy will be able to find loving precursors of his father and more importantly himself with a father who is eventually lovingly found in the external world.

Christopher Bollas cites an account by one of his patients which might help us begin to think about how genitals come to be figured in a young child. When I come to sexual orientation later I will describe the experience of another child.

This is Bollas' patient speaking: (Bollas, 2000, p. 49):

I am having a hard time these days, there are things which I should tell you but which are not so easy. I find myself just staring at [my infant boy] or glaring ... or, well, I find I look at his penis. It is an odd object, by all accounts. I absolutely do not know what I think about it. It is strange that it, or rather that he, came out of my body. It doesn't have anything to do with me, I think, and yet it does. But I am being a bit too ... a bit beside the point ... I think that my mood changes in relation to it, or rather, that I have different feelings about it, wildly different feelings. There are days, or rather moments when I think it is great, it's an amazing sight, and I am pleased to see it; then in a few seconds I can feel that it is ugly, disgraceful and completely 'unnecessary'; that's the word that crosses my mind. I know I convey something of this to [the boy] because when I bath him, sometimes I talk to him about his penis in a good way – you know – saying things like 'what a strong boy', or 'what a nice penis'; but then, there are times when I feel that he is showing it off to me and I feel like cutting it off, I just feel cold, and

indifferent. Well ... not indifferent. I actually feel like I hate it. But it stirs up the most intense feelings at the time. I've no idea what he is making of this.

What is important about this mother is her remarkable capacity to think about her thoughts about her little boy. To be aware enough of her own shifting mental states, her pleasure and incredulity and hatred, and her willingness to wonder how all this affects her son. This way of holding her son and his genitals in her mind, where her son will find himself, is part of what I think Fonagy and Target are describing in metacognition and Ogden is describing with respect to the mother's various and shifting self states around gender. Her sense of her son's genitals would be heavily influenced by her own identifications with her own important male figures when she believed she also had a penis and when she had to realize that she didn't.

As a boy enters the depressive position and the oedipal complex, whole object relating begins. The actual father/other becomes elaborated as an individual in his own right, with his own relationship to the mother who also becomes a whole objects different from the pre-oedipal mother.

The father himself is an important figure of identification for both the boy and girl. I will speak about the girl shortly, but I would like to attend to his importance for the boy here. Again, remember that another male figure may act as a figure of identification. Ogden offers a phantasy that occurs in young boys: "in which [the child] lies between the two parents, during which time the father puts his penis

into the little boy who then develops a strong penis". (Ogden, 1989, p. 402) Ken Corbett describes an example of loving merger between described to him by one of his male clients: "when [A] is in me, it's like I'm filled up with him. Like his cock reaches all the way through to mine, as though we are one". (Corbett, 2002, p. 26) If we understand the importance of identifications in early development, and their maturation over time, we can hear in Corbett's client a loving identification with his partner and not the passive sexuality we might expect to hear about in the descriptions of a negative oedipal complex when typically one of the men is considered feminine because he is in the receptive passive position.

With the entrance of the father, the complexity of possible positions extends and opens further for both boys and girls. The father too carries his early identifications with his mother. He also serves to open the dyadic relationship of mother and child into a larger triadic space.

Prior to this the child has related to mother or to father, and to each of them differently as well as relating to them separately, one at a time. (Aron, 1995, p. 216) With the advent of the oedipal phase the child becomes aware that he or she is part of a system of relationships.

This is an example of how a child of about eighteen months plays within this system:

Occasionally [Michael] directed his parents to stage more complex situations. One evening when he was of 18½ months, Michael had let [his parents] hug each other; his father then left for a minute and when he returned he found Michael sitting on a pillow next to his mother. He immediately got up and offered daddy his seat. But this time he became somewhat tense; when his parents began hugging each other he pulled his mother away and had her make believe she was sleeping on the carpet. He rode horseback on her and then lay down on her. Soon, however, he came over to father, to ride horseback across his knees. This then developed into an exciting rough-housing game. Meanwhile, his mother was not allowed to move; finally, he had daddy lie down next to her. ... Finally, he stretched himself out between his parents. (Abelin, 1975, p. 299)

So, what do you think Michael is “thinking” about in his play?

The oedipal complex potentially coincides with Klein’s depressive position.

Freud would date the oedipal child’s age between three to six years and Klein would date the depressive position and the oedipal experience earlier, from four to six months on. Winnicott would describe the infant’s discovery of external reality, which is a necessary component of oedipal experience, as beginning at about “four to six to eight to twelve months”. (Winnicott, 1971, p. 4) Margaret Mahler would consider the separation-individuation and rapprochement phase as occurring about fifteen to eighteen months. Sullivan, who is a theorist you will meet later in this lecture cycle when Peter presents him, described the dramatic and qualitative shift that occurs in the child’s mental life between the first and second year. Sullivan describes during this period the “transition from the preverbal world of illusion to the verbal world of external language”. (Bromberg, 1998, p. 41-44) It is during this period, from about twelve to eighteen months, that the child is moving from a world dominated by imagery towards a world

where words come to represent things and these words are “consensually validated” by the primary caregivers. In other words, age of onset for these intersecting events is hard to fix and tends to overlap.

We can see that much is going on for a child. It is important for us to try and integrate these theories as part of the larger sense of the multiple lines of interactive development that are occurring and as part of our effort to let new impinging observational data extend our theories. It is equally important because it will help us see that the oedipal period is about more than the acquisition of gender and sexual orientation. It is also about the capacity to form identifications, the ability to tolerate ambivalence, the development of agency, thought and creativity, the acquisition of a language that will carry agency, thought and creativity, and the fostering of a sense of a future and a personal erotic sense.

Pause for a moment to think about why language itself might be important with regard to gender and sexual orientation. When a young girl says to her mother: “mommy I love you, will you come away with me?”, what is happening in the wording? Talking here is not just an example of an oedipal moment going on – talking is itself what is going on. The little girl is formulating her self state verbally and waiting for mom to hold the words and the meaning of object love open for consensual validation. The girl is moving from preverbal imagery to verbal desire and agency – she is trying to effect her capacity to desire and direct that desire

towards a potential love object. Depending on mom's response two possibilities can be held open or collapsed. If mom welcomes her daughter's desire, her daughter will know that it is desire that she is experiencing and that this object is a potential future recipient. If mom refuses or shames, then her daughter's erotic moment will disintegrate and it will also be clear that someone like mom is not an available recipient of future erotic attachment. Be aware here that erotic may mean a future sexual relationship. It may also mean future relationships with other women that can carry the intensity of identification, admiration and pleasure – without a sexual component. These too can become stunted.

We can use Sullivan's contribution to thinking about language as it facilitates movement towards "consensual validation". This shift from imagery as part of an autistic world towards language as establishing a bond between those images and thoughts and words to be used in a consensual external world occurs during the oedipal period. Lewis Aron is helpful in thinking about the pre-oedipal world of imagery and Melanie Klein's theory of the combined parent as a precursor to the later oedipal complex and the primal scene.

The combined parental figure, an imago described by Klein, is present during the paranoid-schizoid position, from birth to about six months, when part object relating and omnipotence dominates. As an imago the combined parent is an unconscious prototype that helps to orient us towards others. The combined parent is described by Klein as follows: "intercourse is viewed in pregenital terms,

as a constant sharing of good foods and good feces; an “everlasting mutual gratification of an oral, anal and genital nature”. (Klein 1952a, p. 55; Aron, 1995, p. 208) The combined parent is an admixture of parental part-objects merged in mutual gratification and attack. As a child moves towards relating to the parents as separate, differentiated and external this combined figure loses strength. What is important for us is that the infant whose world is filled with these part objects - fingers and lips, openings and nipples, feces and food; these part objects are prototypes for penises and vaginas that can combine and mingle in the combined parent imagery. Who has what at that point is still an open question. All sorts of sexual arrangements are possible, some of them aggressive and some of them not. For a child approaching the oedipal complex from this vast array of sexualities the possibilities are limitless. I am going to show you an excerpt from the movie *Me and You and Everyone We Know*. No description I could ever give could create as eloquent an example of polymorphous perversity or sexuality as the exchange of good bits. That the on-line adult in the movie is excited by this early form of sexuality tells you what hides in the resources of the unconscious.

SHOW VIDEO CLIP - ROBBY AND PETER - Responses

The delicate line of associations in the video are wonderfully rendered. Robby wants to know what a bosom is and his brother Peter tells him it's a nice word for

titties. Robby's very next question/association is – Where is mom? Robby is in a world of sexuality with mom at that moment.

Peter's thoughts about mother have to do with her screwing her boyfriend. His sexuality is at a different point. Robby's thoughts are that mom is buying them presents, gifts. There are some very interesting scenes around Peter's sexuality as passive in the movie which are at odds with Peter's sense of having to be a man as he describes it here. While Peter's thoughts run to powerful vehicles, Robby's system of sexuality is not screwing or power, it's a system of exchange and the sharing of poop gifts. Intercourse, sexuality, and who can put what into whom is an open possibility. When Klein talks about the combined parent as sharing good food and feces and when Freud talks about the first gifts of the child as feces, and the exchange of a penis for a baby, or the child's experience of sexuality as bodily based and not just genitalia, Robby shows us how its done – forever. Which is a simple way of saying, as Freud does, that are earliest relationships are with us always.

Forever is an echo of Freud's belief that the oedipal arrangement and resolution influences our relationships for the remainder of our life. (Freud, 1905, p. 90; 1925, p. 257) The logic of Robby's imaginative elaboration of openings and poop, giving, receiving and exchanging; of sexuality and intimacy, helps us understand what phantasy can be like as a means of thinking about exciting things.

Earlier I gave you an example of the importance of finding language to symbolize the importance of early images of sexuality. This is Robby doing just that.

SHOW VIDEO CLIP – ROBBY AT THE COMPUTER DRAWING – Responses

Robby is both drawing and symbolizing his phantasy as he understands it as a means to sexuality. He is literally finding and copying those symbols from the conversation he is having with this unknown other.

The primal scene is such a phantasy. It was introduced by Freud, developed and extended by Melanie Klein, and elaborated by both Thomas Ogden and Lewis Aron.

When the child begins to experience the parents as separate from him or herself, and as separate from each other the child enters into the depressive position and the oedipal constellation. The oedipal triangle participates in the development of subjectivity and objectivity.

Ronald Britton (1989, p. 86) describes this oedipal space and object relationships:

The closure of the oedipal triangle by the recognition of the link joining the parents provides a limiting boundary for the internal world. It creates what [he]

call[s] a “triangular space” – i.e., a space bounded by the three persons of the oedipal situation and all their potential relationships. It includes therefore, the possibility of being a participant in a relationship and observed by a third person as well as being an observer of a relationship between two [other] people.

If we refer back to Fonagy and Target we can make the following equation.

Mentalization suggests that being seen by another relates to being thought about and held in the others mind, and seeing others relates to being able to think about other separate beings as centres of initiative different from one’s own.

These are important developmental processes. They are important skills and as therapists we know them to be essential for the capacity to enter into therapeutic dialogue, for both the therapist and the client.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE

As Britton’s quote above suggests, with the beginning recognition that one’s relationship with one parent is observed and thought about by the other, and with the realization by the child that the parent’s have a relationship that does not include the child, but which the child observes and begins to think about differently, we begin to see the following developments: I am a subject with my own thoughts and agency. Agency, as we will see later comes in part from the child’s identifications with both parents. I am also an object amongst other objects. I am an object for other objects that notice and think about me. Others are objects for me and I think about them. Others have a separate subjectivity and agency from my own. (Aron, 1995, p. 217)

A child can begin to “think” - sometimes I am with mother and the other one will be watching me, admiring me, envious of me. Sometimes I am with the other who now welcomes me because I am envied, hated or admired by the one I was with first. And now those two others have left me out, they are together without me and I hate them and love them and now I am between them and they love me. Think about Michael, who I described earlier orchestrating his parent’s interactions.

You wouldn’t think so much could be packed into one little experience would you? It takes more time to say in words what the child knows without “thinking”.

Ambivalence dominates the depressive position. The young child is learning to tolerate the excitements and confusion of a highly cathected scene without attacking the parents or splitting them apart. The acceptance of the parents together, the parents as separate and sometimes merged in intercourse, the dawning sense of sexual difference formerly held unconsciously in both parents and now actually encountered by the child in a wider world of others of both genders; and the important understanding of difference based in a distinction between the first person you were with and the other person who comes from afar - from the outside world, constitutes the vast and fluid movement possible within the oedipal triangle. The child is moving between these similarities and

differences, masculine and feminine, male and female and the myriad combinations of possible sexual acts.

Jessica Benjamin will describe it thus: “symbolic identifications like “mother” and “father” establish ... points on the internal map on which the parents, the analyst, and the self can be imagined as moveable spheres. Real objects chart their trajectory across these points and along the axis of “masculinity” and “femininity”, not in straight lines but in complex patterns”. (Benjamin, 1991, p. 296-297)

(Bev’s sphere)

We are considering the child now as navigating an area of relating that involves both parents as bigendered, external and therefore no longer omnipotently controlled, as benevolent and sometimes threatening. This new trajectory includes the recognition of sexual difference and sexual relating. What has also come on-line is the child’s capacity for subjective and objective thought, the awareness of separateness, and the necessity of and desire for individuation. Identifications with both parents and the purposes that these identifications serve are one of the means by which the child learns to tolerate ambivalence and the tensions inherent to separation-individuation and object-relating. Throughout this period the child acquires a more discerned and differentiated sense of their own gender.

Let us again return to the pre-oedipal and oedipal world of the infant in light of current research as it helps us develop an understanding of either child's early identifications. We have considered the importance of the mother for the pre-oedipal girl and boy. Freud understood the pre-oedipal period as more significant for the girl with her mother as a precursor to the later positive oedipal period when the girl would identify with her mother and take her father as an object of desire. He understood the pre-oedipal mother as significant for the boy and his ongoing love of her was meant to explain the boy's later oedipal desire for her.

Ogden has offered us a way to think about the importance of the mother based on her bisexual capacities as a means for the girl to hold her own bisexuality, elaborate her bodily experiences through identification and as a way to begin to imagine the father/other that will further expand her complex understanding of her gender. The pre-oedipal mother for the boy must also allow him to find and hold his own bisexuality, begin to elaborate his own bodily experiences, make the transition to the father/other and also expand his own complex acquisition of his gender. (and the pre-oedipal mother must become another mother in order to be his oedipal mother). We now need to find a way to include the importance of the pre-oedipal and oedipal father, and this is where current infant research and direct observation is helpful.

Ernst Abelin worked under Margaret Mahler at the Masters Children's Center. In his writing he describes why he came to believe that an "early triangulation" begins to occur around eighteen months. Referring to Piaget, Abelin argues that: "... there is no way in which the toddler can conceive of himself as another object in [the] world so long as he remains unable to form a mental image of himself, as placed in what Piaget has called 'a reversible space' along with other represented objects. [the oedipal space] Nor can he truly know that it is he who is desiring the desirable object. (Abelin, 1975, p. 293) At fifteen months the child can begin to form a mental image based on imitation. At eighteen months this image is internalized and becomes a "mental image". The child is developing the capacity to recognize patterns of relating, what Stern might call RIGS, and to sense him or herself in the midst of these patterns. The "evoked other" that Stern describes as a regulating presence is what Abelin is describing within the early world of child and mother. What Abelin goes on to present is the equally important presence of the father. The image of the father makes its appearance only a few weeks after the image of the mother in play, fantasy and dreams. (Abelin, 1975, p. 294) This can happen as early as the symbiotic period described by Mahler, which occurs from about the second month on. (Mahler, Pine, Bergman, 1975, p. 44)

Margaret Mahler suggested that the rapprochement phase occurs around eighteen months. During this time there is a growing awareness of separation as the toddler becomes mobile. As the child wanders and discovers the world the

first caregivers availability for “refuelling” and interest in the child’s discoveries is vital. Loss during this period, and remember we are talking about a pre-oedipal child for whom loss will increasingly become an organizer, concerns losing the love of the object rather than object loss. (Mahler, 1975, p. 78) The toddler’s earliest love objects are slowly becoming separate individuals and the toddler gradually and agonizingly gives up a sense of their own omnipotence and grandiosity. (Mahler, 1975, p. 79)

The ordinary ambivalence of this period: love and frustration, curiosity and control, hatred and survival, male and female, are just that – developmentally ordinary and important. With the parent’s help through availability and encouragement, the toddler is able to move back and forth between the outside world and the parents as internal objects, and can libidinally invest in curiosity, exploration and differing relational dynamics. This gentle acceptance of limitations, frustrations to the child’s grandiosity, and the socializations that sometimes means encountering “no”, ensures that ambivalence does not become a form of splitting.

Mahler points out that the father is part of the “active extension of the mother-child world”. (Mahler, 1975, p. 91) What Abelin discovered in his direct observations of a family and through their reports to him, was that as early as six months, rather than eighteen, Michael was able to distinguish and form attachments to each of the three adults living in the home. Michael’s relationship

with his father seemed to develop side by side with his relationship to his mother from the earliest weeks and shared many of its symbiotic qualities. (Abelin, 1975, p. 298) For Abelin, “On an observational level, it [was] therefore difficult to maintain that father ‘emerges’ at some point, as if from outer space. ... the [maternal and paternal] ‘spaces’ probably overlap”. (Abelin, 1975, p. 298)

This helps us think differently about the role of the father in a child’s development. Michael’s early capacity to recognize and form relationships with both parents; and to refuel, as Abelin describes, not with the mother alone but by seeking “specific refuelling” with the parent who had been absent for the longest period of time, (Abelin, 1975, p. 297) suggests that there is an early importance for the place of the father.

In a review of psychoanalytic theory, Kim Jones provides a historical overview of the role of the father. She refers to Abelin and a study conducted by Michael Lamb, where Lamb concluded that “the differences between mothers and fathers appear much less important than the similarities ... Parental warmth, nurturance, and closeness are associated with positive child outcomes whether the parent or adult involved is a mother or a father”. (Jones, 2005, p. 9)

Jones also cites a paper by Davids who suggested “that the object who performs maternal functions and contributes to the formation of the ‘object we come to refer to as the internal mother can be anyone who occupies this role with the

child” and it might also be argued that “anyone who performs paternal functions contributes to the internalized paternal representation”. (Jones, 2005, p. 10)

Paternal function here is twofold. First, the father’s importance for the boy is his maleness and masculinity in that he helps develop what Loewald described as a positive and “exquisitely masculine identification” for the boy. In his way of being a man, father helps the boy consolidate a sense of his own gender.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE

How a father or a significant male figure integrates his own childhood experiences of his parents directly affects his own way of carrying masculinity and making room in himself for his son. If a father, or another male, is reliably and consistently present for the boy to encounter in the outside world, the young boy will consolidate his masculinity, his felt sense of being a boy. CLINICAL

EXAMPLE

Teachers, coaches, uncles, siblings and best friends can all carry this function for a boy – a welcoming and accepting presence who will take pleasure in the child’s body and energy.

The second paternal function of the father is not exclusively male. He/she is the other-other, and this role is necessary for both children because it supports the

child's separation from the intense world of the primary caregiver. Children of both sexes dread re-engulfment in the maternal world and the availability of this other figure apart from mother, provides support for separation and self-hood. (Tuttman, 1986, p. 315; Loewald, 1951) Both the male and female child are going to want to leave mother and explore, and they will resist leaving because there is a fear of loss and change to that first world. This new other joins in with the beginning sense of a separate self, the capacity for autonomous physical movement, and the beginning of symbolic thought and language. This other, who is different from the first other, represents the exciting external world.

For our purposes this is useful in thinking about the way both a boy and a girl navigate their early dyadic and triadic relationships. If both parents are available very early on rather than through sequential development, and are available for identification as well as erotic attachments – then we have another way to rethink gender and sexual orientation. These early pre-symbolic identifications of the self-body and other-body interactions (Benjamin, 2002, p. 128) become the foundation on which one's felt sense of maleness and femaleness, one's sense of being like and unlike across the gamut of body and genitals, rest. But areas of like and unlike also register and are realized in experiences of activity, excitements, exploration and agency – these remain un-gendered in as much as they are the properties of all bodies. And finally, how bodies approach, connect, refuse and collide, are also of interest to us, because these will become the forms of erotic attachment and erotic sense so necessary for the child to move

his or her erotic life out into a world beyond mother and father or other and other other.

If the father is important in the pre-oedipal world of both children and the oedipal world of separation and individuation for both children and the oedipal world of identification for the growing boy, what then is his helpfulness to the oedipal girl with respect to identification?

Jessica Benjamin developed what she called “identificatory love”. During the rapprochement phase both children are continuing to differentiate their parents as separate beings, but Benjamin argues that both children continue to elaborate their identifications with both parents as aspects of themselves. (Benjamin, 2002, p. 129) The father/other as they are discovered differently in the oedipal period, comes to represent and hold open another world. The father/other here is dyadic, not the triadic experience of the father/other that is oedipal. It is precisely the availability of this other as a different and separate relationship, a way to wander away from mother without getting too lost; that makes this new presence important. This otherness will come to represent freedom, exploration, autonomy and agency. The child will identify with the father/other as a “like subject”, a subject able to effect their own desires. (Benjamin, 2002, p. 129) This is of course important for both a boy and a girl.

But we need to open up what same and different is here if we are to unlock gender particularity. Mother for both the boy and the girl in the pre-oedipal period is someone who is a source of goodness, not a separate subject. She is part of a period when omnipotence and grandiosity predominate, she is part of a same shared world and identification with her is to this sameness, for both children. As a separate subject in the oedipal period, father is different. For the boy this difference is, as I described earlier, twofold in as much as father is like in gender and unlike in agency. For a girl, father is unlike in gender and a subject to be like in his difference as an agent outside of her first world with mother. Father's acceptance of her as a subject like him, his recognition in her of the qualities she sees in him, invests her self structure with a capacity to be an active agent in her own world and in effecting her own erotic life. As a girl develops she too will seek other important people, women she can admire and identify with as part of her continuing elaboration of her gender and her efficacy.

All of these approaches to the pre-oedipal and oedipal period have a common cause. Theoretically we strive for parsimony, a way to explain things simply, using the simplest assumption in the development of a theory or in the interpretation of experience. We are trying to understand gender, but one theory will not work because we are talking at minimum about two different sexes trying to acquire a sense of gender based on experiences of two other genders, whether directly in their family or in the world at large at some point. So, if we want one theory, it must itself be bi-gendered. As a theory it must account for the

continual presence of both biological sexes, without reifying gender as what it means to be either sex from the beginning. Our theory must also account for the reality that mother or father may not be male or female at the outset. As a theory it must find a way to account for the fact that every individual will encounter the other sex, in fact must encounter the other sex, as part of a developmental process in acquiring a sense of one's own gender. But what it means to be masculine and feminine is an elaboration of how one understands what it means to be male or female in one's family; however it is arranged, and in the social world in which one eventually lives.

And to complicate things further, as if they weren't complicated enough, our theories must also come to understand what orientation our erotic life will follow, without tying orientation do gender. As I showed with Tyson's article, our theory also needs to refrain from a heterosexual structure. In addition to a bi-gendered theory it needs to be bisexual as well in that the subject ranges freely over male and female objects.

Consider the subtle difference of these two sentences. We will take the girl as our subject.

I want to be like daddy with mummy.

Meaning I want to have a penis like daddy to be with mummy – this is gender play.

I want to be with mummy like daddy.

The little girl remains a little girl to be with mummy like daddy is, without necessarily wanting to be daddy – this is play within the domain of sexual orientation.

What is orientation about? There is a subject and a desire, and there is an object a target for that desire, and therefore there is a direction.

I want to tell you a story I told once before. I really enjoy this story because there is such a twist to the way it tells us about something we think has a particular trajectory and direction. Theory needs to be like this – a way of telling us something with an ironic twist. Here is the story.

There is a master archer and he has trained his whole life in the pursuit of the perfect release of the arrow that strikes the bulls-eye at its heart. He hears one day of a village with an archer that never misses the target and so he goes seeking that archer in the hopes of learning how to execute the perfect release.

He arrives at the outskirts of the village and as he walks he sees everywhere bulls-eyes with an arrow dead centre. He sees them in trees and on barns; he notices them on stumps and on posts. He arrives in the village and he asks the first passer by - who is the perfect archer - I must seek his guidance. The villager looks at the master archer as if he were slightly crazed, because indeed the

master archer is slightly crazed. He has been on this quest for a very long time and now his ideal is at hand. The villager directs the master archer to the last house on the road and to the little girl who lives there.

The master archer hurries forward perplexed but eager, how can one so young have achieved accuracy so early. He arrives at the house and finds a girl of ten. He beseeches her to reveal her secret - does she meditate, does she become one with the bow, does she yield to the nature of the arrow.

She looks at him and smiles. No, I just shoot the arrow and after it lands I take my paint set and draw a target around it. I really like to paint.

We must be careful not to place the target before the shot.

A child of four is on their way out into the world. To make passage from home and out into that world they internalize their care givers and the others - siblings, grandparents, aunts and uncles, friends that come their way.

But, remember that we have said the child is a “like subject” a subject with desire. Something of the child's desire for the world must now be awake. The child will be constantly shooting arrows, drawing targets and conclusions.

When I was thinking about the section on sexual orientation for a previous talk I woke up one morning with the phrase “there is not enough current in that”, I seemed to be talking to someone about electrical voltage. I understood this at the time as a metaphor. I do believe that while a child is trying on identifications with others he or she is also trying out object choices and like a mini voltage meter is registering the range and strength of met and unmet desires.

I believe that we do see this in play if we allow it to be what it is.

I will retell the story of my niece - Sierra. She was almost three. Dana and I went to visit on Christmas day. One of our presents for Sierra was a soft doll from the groovy girl collection. We gave Sierra one with long blond hair, funky striped socks and a flowered skirt. She opened the present and jumped up and ran to get the groovy girl she got from her parents. That groovy girl had dark hair and a long pretty pale green dress with white flowers.

She looked at Dana and I and with a provocative smile she did this with the two dolls, (gesture), she giggled and ran off to play.

I looked at Dana who looked at me - we were delighted by her pleasure and her spontaneity. But I was stunned. I could of course go through all the theoretical machinations of thought that would weigh Sierra's gesture down with freighted

meaning. But I knew then what I really experienced and could only eventually bring to thought. Its this: can it really be that normal and playful?

Sierra I hope knew what I had forgotten. We play in our genders and in our orientations and we remember that play as we remember other's responses to it.

When I recalled that incident I realized that the memory was tinged with sadness for me. It reminded me of something I experienced as a child.

I remember as a young girl of about four or five standing beside my mother's chair. I looked at my mother and meaning to be inviting I asked her if she would come away with me. The memory had a slightly romantic and erotic feel. I couldn't remember my mother's immediate response but the memory changes into one of embarrassment.

Later in the evening when my father came home my mother said to me - tell your father what you said to me earlier. I said no and felt deeply ashamed.

All these years later I realized that I felt like my yearnings to be with my mother, my erotic longings and flirtations, had been pushed away. My mother, rather than allowing this to be a moment between us seemed unable to tolerate these erotic longings for her. Instead she placed me in a competitive position with my

father as if I were a little boy. A moment of dyadic relating had prematurely and negatively been reconstituted as triadic.

I remember a later incident where I am sitting on the bed with my mother, and we were talking. My father came into the room and became very angry. He told me to get out and go to bed. He might just as well have implied that something sexual was going on between myself and my mother and he knew what I was up to as his rival.

I think about Sierra in her joyful play and I think about myself in my attempts with my mother, and I experience the gulf between them as painful. I was startled to come across an acknowledgment of this experience in my readings.

Nancy McWilliams in her article "Therapy Across the Sexual Orientation Boundary" refers to what she thinks the difficulties are that some lesbians and gay men might experience.

"Depending on how one's early objects treated one's sexuality, they may be suffused with shame" (McWilliams, 1996, p. 217).

McWilliams went on to say that she believed that it might be difficult for a client who is lesbian to raise certain experiences of longing or allow them into a transference relationship with her because of the client's working assumption is

that these longings will leave the therapist cold and unresponsive. (McWilliams, 1996, p. 217)

McWilliams explained that in her own personal therapy experiences she was at least able to tolerate her male therapist's refusal of her sexual longings by telling herself that he was probably entertaining similar feelings but because of his professional conduct could not act on them. This of course is not a permanent solution to such longings because they need to be explored, but she knew later that this was how she was initially able to tolerate the rejection.

She went on to write "I found it hard to give Alice a comparable experience because of her assumption that my reaction to her feelings was erotic indifference. Her difficulties suggest that one of the ways that children give up oedipal strivings without undue suffering is via the knowledge that the desired parent has the same private wish to walk into the sunset with his or her preschool child. And often, this is exactly the experience that gay and lesbian people missed in early childhood - the feeling that their sexual interests were stimulating, delightful, precious, poignant, and safe". (McWilliams, 1996, p. 218)

A child must come up against a refusal, the incest taboo. If the refusal is overlaid with disturbances in the child-parent relationship, or with an inability of the parent to accept the erotic longings of a same-sexed child without repositioning that

child into the opposite gender, then those longings will be weighted with shame and confusion. Remember also my description of “C” earlier.

It is very true that a young girl wants to be with mummy in a way that is tinged with longings, identifications, desires to be like, and erotic feelings. There is a mixture of gender here and of object choice.

If the girl is responded to she has the possibility of taking on a sense of being like mummy. If she has had a reliable and present other she will also come to understand herself as being able to initiate and effect her desires, she is able to become a subject of desires - an independent subject.

If the little girl is also expressing object love and she is responded to with pleasure and enjoyment, if both parents are available for testing and flirtation, she will expand the possibilities of her future relationships, regardless of her orientation. By responded to I do not mean that the parent acts on the longing. I mean that the longing is cherished as it is and the little girl is not repositioned as father's rival.

If she is repositioned by the mother as like a little boy because of her erotic strivings she will likely fail to see herself as a girl like mummy - she will also fail to experience her erotic longings as welcome and cherished, and she will not come to know desire as desire.

Adrienne Harris makes the following statement in “Gender as Contradiction”:

“any human experience of sexuality and identity is built on a unique and particular sentence in which the elements of subjectivity, action and object are never inherent or inevitable. Unlinking aim from object and allowing the play of sexual forms and symbolic meanings for bodies, selves, and acts are the radical core of Freud’s theory of desire and gender”. (Harris, 1991, p. 201).

“An object choice ideally represents a world of multiple sexualities and the preserving of all prior forms of loving. The love object technically must be one gender or another, that is, formally either female or male, but unconsciously and symbolically, this object choice is a multilayered, multisexed creation. It is not, of course, that the gender identity of the lover is unimportant, but that it both expresses a powerful resolution of conflicting aims and preserves all elements of the conflict”. (Harris, 1991, p. 208).

Throughout our life these underlying conflicts will enliven the way we play out our masculinity and femininity, and they will underpin our erotic enjoyment of others. We will come to see ourselves as male and female, and we will know the erotic register that we love within, but it will not be created by the foreclosure of our identifications with difference or the shunning of sameness.

Adam Phillips has an interesting paper called “On Flirtation: An Introduction”. It is in itself an irreverent and playful look at the virtues of flirtation as a prospect for theoretical development. He argues that “hierarchies and putative oppositions can be used to constrain the possibilities of difference, compelling us to make moral and erotic choices before we have been able to find out what there is to choose from ... Flirting may not be a poor way of doing something better, but a different way of doing something else”. (Phillips, 1994, p. xxii)

Flirting, as Phillips points out, is what all children do with both their parents, and it is all they can safely do sexually. In the period of waiting to be a grown up, flirting is practice for pleasure, and as Phillips states, makes ambivalence into a game. (Phillips, 1994, p. xxiii) A child’s innocent and playful attempts to seduce both parents at different times, if enjoyed and withstood by either parent, is both a frustration and a relief for the child. A relief because of course their maturity is incapable of processing the intensity of actual adult sexuality, and frustrating because of the continued challenge encompassed by realizing one’s limits without giving up one’s desires.

And the parents must hold to their own innocent flirtations. They seduce the child out of their auto-erotic world, a world where the child omnipotently believes that all their wishes are self-fulfilled. As the parents are discovered to have separate wills the parents also take on the role of enticing the child into excited and playful engagement.

How might this work? At about fifteen months, children begin to masturbate. This is where Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit* or deferred realization helps us. This is from Bollas: "the mother's desire of the ... infantile body is crucial to one's sexual well-being, but if we regard the first stages of genital masturbation as a moment when deferred infantile sexuality ... is now 'remembered', then the self stimulating 15-month-old will simultaneously recall to his or her bodily pleasures the mother's hands. ... if the mother was seductive, then the child will make the unconscious link between self-stimulation and maternal love". (Bollas, 2000, p. 31)

Masturbation evokes sensations, RIGS associated with the care and caresses of the mother's presence. It sensualizes both the child's body and the mother's, and other bodies as well. I would like you to take a look at this photograph. Other bodies are also important to a child's sensual experiences.

Suppression of masturbation interrupts the child's erotic expression and the child's message – I am aroused and I can take care of this myself. These efforts at suppression are an attempt to move the child from their capacity to satisfy all of their own needs by self stimulation. Suppression does not only equate to a prohibition, though that also occurs, if another solution is available. As both parents become increasingly separate and differentiated, they offer an outward

trajectory for the child's excitement and sensuality, they offer themselves as exciting others with whom the child finds and experiences early erotic play.

Sexuality becomes part of the organization of relating to others. But the self as subject is not a blank slate; we come with our own constitutional endowment.

The child's trajectory may differ from the parent's lead and the self's agency will also provide an arc for the parents to follow.

Freud wrote: "It should ... on no account be forgotten that the relation between the two [constitutional and accidental] is a cooperative and not a mutually exclusive one. The constitutional factor must await experiences before it can make itself felt; the accidental factor must have a constitutional basis in order to come into operation". (Freud, 1905, p. 165)

This is Kafka's arrow being launched towards the target for which it was intended, or the master archer knowing the arrow has arrived by painting the target. The responsiveness and acceptance of the child's flirtations lends solidity in the form of real objects to the child's imagination.

Freud again: "The child takes both of its parents, and more particularly one of them, as the object of its erotic wishes. In so doing, it usually follows some direction from its parents whose affection bears the clearest characteristics of a sexual activity, even though it is clearly inhibited in its aim". (Bollas, 2000, p. 32)

This is a fairly gender free statement. A child in concert with their own constitution will read the responsive opportunities of its surround. A child will also read the discomfort, rigidity and refusal of their erotic trajectory – efforts to stop or redirect the arrow in flight. Moments of shame, fear or disgust result in erotic withdrawal.

As a child moves towards either parent the presence of the second parent acts like a detour in the middle of the road – a bit like saying this far and no further – you have to find another route. This is harder for a single parent – but not impossible. Interior to that single parent’s awareness is the knowledge that the child is not a lover. Let me show you a final scene between Robby and his computer correspondent.

SHOW VIDEO CLIP – ROBBY IN THE PARK – Responses

Robby is a fascinated young suitor and in the moment when the woman looks at him, looks away and smiles, there is something in that smile of recognition. It is the recognition of his flirtations with the other. Her sensual and chaste kiss before she gets up and leaves is an invitation and a caution – yes – but not yet and not with me.

What I also noticed in this scene is that the woman on the bench responds with interest and anticipation to the woman who jogs by and to the man who stops to do Tai Chi.

Conclusion

Children strive in their relating to locate themselves solidly somewhere with someone. This must be someone with whom they can reveal themselves freely; with the understanding that they will be welcomed and cherished for whom, and how they are. This is imperative. This does not privilege anything as given, it privileges freedom. As Phillips states, the ways in which we try to get around our Oedipal Complex is our Oedipal Complex. (Phillips, 1994, p. xxv) I would argue that it is a theory built for one person at a time. Experientially, as I wrote this lecture, I found myself in the world of our earliest relationships – when as infants and toddlers and adolescents, we are trying to locate ourselves with others, others to be like, others to push against and safely differentiate ourselves from, others to love. We do this throughout our life, but our early experiences are formative. The remainder of our growth lies in the willingness and creativeness with which we try to rework those experiences until they work for us as individuals in the free expression of our erotic life.

We will have love affairs with many people in our lifetime – friends, mentors, supervisors, clients, our own therapist and our chosen partners. By love affairs I do not mean sexual relating. I mean the intense erotic meeting of sameness and difference that comes with being interested in, excited by and changed through our engagement with important others. How freely we can bring ourselves to each of these, how many components of our erotic sense we can allow to reside with each of these people of either sex; and how completely we can allow ourselves to unfold and be with the one we choose as a life partner, are the ongoing living reorganization of our oedipal experiences.

As psychotherapists, we hold to a belief in the importance of the integration of the self, all aspects of the self. Integration is not the equivalent of silencing those dimensions of self that are contrary, different or conflicted. Neither do we advocate the sequestering into alternate self states or dissociations, those aspects of self that do not fit in. We strive for the capacity to call all these self experiences “mine”. Jonathan Lear writes in the conclusion to his book titled Freud: “in a successful psychoanalysis, a free speech becomes possible. I can begin to speak for myself. And I can begin to speak for myself because, in psychoanalytic conversation, I have constituted myself. ... The aim of psychoanalysis is not to promote homogenization of the soul but to establish active lines of communication between what hitherto had been disparate and warring parts. These lines of communication serve a bridging function – unifying the psyche by bringing its different voices into a common conversation. ... And I

will have developed the practical skill of genuinely speaking for myself when I do come to a decision on how to deal with the conflict. ... thus when I take a stand in speech or action, it is I who take the stand.” Lear, 2005, p. 222) (see also Aron, 1995, p. 203, Rivera quote)

In any culture colonization never works because the subdued culture always seeks its own freedoms and rights. Bollas called theories a metasensual phenomenon not a colonization of the therapeutic mind dominated by a single system of inquiry. Theories are a way of seeing; psychotherapy is a way of listening for both parties, and being a therapist is a way of speaking; a way of entering into a conversation. Our clients will know the range of our unconscious capacities and they will rightly resist the colonization of their own experiences and minds by ours. Our minds must be a safer place for them to visit than the ones they have already known.

SHOW VIDEO CLIP – MARGARET CHO – DADDY IS GAY

Lecture given at the Centre for Training in Psychotherapy - November 15, 2008

Sharon Bedard

References and Resources

- Abelin, E. (1975). Some further observations and comments on the earliest role of the father. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 56, 293-302.
- Altman, N. (1997). The case of Ronald Oedipal issues in the treatment of a seven-year old boy. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 7(6), 725-739.
- Aron, L. (1995). The internalized primal scene. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 5(2), 195-237.
- Bacal, H., & Newman, K. (1990). *Theories of object relations: Bridges to self psychology*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bassin, D. (1997). Beyond the he and the she: Towards a reconciliation of masculinity and femininity in the postoedipal female mind. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 44 Supplement, 157-190.
- Benjamin, J. (1991). Father and daughter: Identification with difference - a contribution to gender heterodoxy. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 1(3), 277-299.
- Benjamin, J. (1992). Reply to Schwartz. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 2(3), 417-424.
- Benjamin, J. (1994). Commentary on papers by Tansey, Davies, and Hirsch. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4(2), 193-201.
- Benjamin, J. (1995). *Like subjects, love objects essays on recognition and sexual difference*. London: Yale University Press.

- Benjamin, J. (1996). In defense of gender ambiguity. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 1(1), 27-43.
- Benjamin, J. (1997). Response to Ronnie Lesser. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(3), 389-398.
- Benjamin, J. (1998). *Shadow of the other intersubjectivity and gender in psychoanalysis*. London: Routledge.
- Benjamin, J. (2002). Sameness and difference: An "overinclusive" view of gender constitution. In M. Dimen & V. Goldner (Eds.), *Gender in psychoanalytic space between clinic and culture* (pp. 182-206). New York: Other Press.
- Blos, P. (1984). Son and father. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 32, 301-324.
- Blum, A., & Pfetzing, V. (1997). Assaults to the self: The trauma of growing up gay. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(4), 427-442.
- Bohan, J. (1996). *Psychology and sexual orientation*. New York: Routledge.
- Bohan, J., Russell, G., & et all. *Conversations about psychology and sexual orientation*. New York: New York University Press.
- Bollas, C. (1987). At the other's play: To dream. In *Shadow of the object* (pp. 64-81). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bollas, C. (1997). Wording and telling sexuality. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 78, 363-367.
- Bollas, C. (2000). *Hysteria*. London: Routledge.
- Bollas, C. (2000). Sexual epiphany. In *Hysteria* (pp. 13-26). London: Routledge.

- Bollas, C. (2000). *Sexuality and its transformations*. In *Hysteria* (pp. 27-40). London: Routledge.
- Bollas, C. (2002). *Free association*. Cambridge: Icon Books.
- Bollas, C. (2007). *The Freudian moment*. London: Karnac Books.
- Braga, J. C. *A glance at Oedipus: Some ideas on the in/capacity to think*. Retrieved 6/14/02, from <http://www.sicap.it/-merciai/papers/braga.htm>.
- Britton, R. (2007). *The missing link: Parental sexuality in the Oedipus complex*. In R. Britton, M. Feldman & E. O'Shaughnessy (Eds.), *The Oedipus complex today clinical implications* (pp. 83-101). London: Karnac Books.
- Britton, R., Feldman, M., & O'Shaughnessy, E. (1989). *The Oedipus complex today clinical implications*. London: Karnac Books.
- Bromberg, P. (1996). *The multiplicity of self and the psychoanalytic relationship*. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 32, 509-535.
- Bromberg, P. (1998). *Standing in the spaces*. London: The Analytic Press.
- Bromberg, P. (2006). *Awakening the dreamer*. London: The Analytic Press.
- Bromberg, P. (2008). *Shrinking the tsunami*. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 44(3), 329-349.
- Brothers, D. (2008). *Muting the sirens of certainty beyond dichotomous gender and the Oedipus complex*. In *Towards a psychology of uncertainty trauma-centered psychoanalysis* (pp. 85-106). London: The Analytic Press.
- Brothers, D., & Lewinberg, E. (1999). *Contemplating the death of oedipus*. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 4(4), 497-515.

- Butler, J. (1990). *Gender trouble*. New York: Routledge.
- Butler, J. (1995). Reply to Adam Phillips. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 5(2), 189-193.
- Butler, J. (1998). Analysis to the core commentary on papers by James H. Hansell and Dianne Elise. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(3), 373-377.
- Butler, J. (2002). Melancholy gender-refused identification. In M. Dimen & V. Goldner (Eds.), *Gender in psychoanalytic space between clinic and culture* (pp. 3-19). New York: Other Press.
- Chodorow, N. (1992). Heterosexuality as compromise formation: Reflections on the psychoanalytic theory of sexual development. *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought*, 15(3), 267-304.
- Chodorow, N. (1999). From subjectivity in general to subjective gender in particular. In *Female sexuality contemporary engagements* (pp. 241-250). Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Chodorow, N. (2002). Prejudice exposed on Stephen Mitchell's pioneering investigations of the psychoanalytic treatment and mistreatment of homosexuality. *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, 3(1), 61-72.
- Coates, S. (1997). Is it time to jettison the concept of developmental lines? commentary on De Marneffe's paper "Bodies and words." *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(1), 35-53.

- Coates, S. (2005). Having a mind of one's own and holding the other in mind: Commentary on paper by Peter Fonagy and Mary Target. In L. Aron & A. Harris (Eds.), *Relational psychoanalysis innovation and expansion* (Vol. 2, pp. 279-310). London: The Analytic Press.
- The contemporary Kleinians. (1997) (R. Schafer, Ed.). Connecticut: International Universities Press, Inc.
- Cooper, S. (1998). Flirting, post-Oedipus, and mutual protectiveness in the analytic dyad commentary on paper by Jody Messler Davies. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(6), 767-779.
- Cooper, S. (2003). You say oedipal, I say postoedipal a consideration of desire and hostility in the analytic relationship. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 13(1), 41-63.
- Corbett, K. (1996). Homosexual boyhood: Notes on girlyboys. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 1(4), 429-461.
- Corbett, K. (1997). Speaking queer: A reply to Richard Friedman. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(4), 495-514.
- Corbett, K. (2001). Faggott=Loser. *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, 2(1), 3-28.
- Corbett, K. (2002). The mystery of homosexuality. In M. Dimen & V. Goldner (Eds.), *Gender in psychoanalytic space between clinic and culture* (pp. 21-39). New York: Other Press.
- Davies, J. M. (1994). Love in the afternoon a relational reconsideration of dread and desire in the countertransference. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4(2), 153-170.

- Davies, J. M. (1998). Between the disclosure and foreclosure of erotic transference-countertransference can psychoanalysis find a place for adult sexuality? *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(6), 747-766.
- Davies, J. M. (1998). Multiple perspectives on multiplicity. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(2), 195-206.
- Davies, J. M. (1998). Thoughts on the nature of desires: The ambiguous, the transitional and the poetic reply to commentaries. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(6), 805-823.
- Davies, J. M. (2003). Falling in love with love oedipal and postoedipal manifestations of idealization, mourning and erotic masochism. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 13(1), 1-27.
- Davies, J. M. (2003). Reflections on Oedipus, post-Oedipus and termination commentary on paper by Steven Cooper. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 13(1), 65-75.
- De Marneffe, D. (1997). Bodies and words: A study of young children's genitals and gender knowledge. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(1), 3-33.
- Dervin, D. (1998). The Electra complex: A history of misrepresentations. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 30(4), 451-470.
- Diamond, M. (1997). Boys to men: The maturing of masculine gender identity through paternal watchful protectiveness. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(4), 443-468.

- Diamond, M. (1998). Fathers with sons: Psychoanalytic perspectives on "Good enough" fathering throughout the life cycle. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 3(3), 243-299.
- Difference *A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*. (2006). .
- Dimen, M. (1991). Deconstructing difference: Gender, splitting, and transitional space. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 1(3), 335-352.
- Dimen, M. (1999). Between lust and libido sex, psychoanalysis and the moment before. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 9(4), 415-440.
- Dimen, M. (2003). *Sexuality, intimacy, power*. London: The Analytic Press.
- Dimen, M. (2005). Perversion is us? eight notes. In L. Aron & A. Harris (Eds.), *Relational psychoanalysis* (Vol. 2, pp. 377-415). London: The Analytic Press.
- Disorienting sexuality psychoanalytic reappraisals of sexual identities. (1995) (T. Domenici & R. Lesser, Eds.). London: Routledge.
- Drescher, J. (1995). Anti-homosexual bias in training. In T. Dominici & R. Lesser (Eds.), *Disorienting sexuality psychoanalytic reappraisals of sexual identity* (pp. 227-241). London: Routledge.
- Drescher, J. (1996). A discussion across sexual orientation and gender boundaries; reflections of a gay male analyst to a heterosexual female analyst. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 1(2), 223-237.
- Drescher, J. (1997). From preoedipal to postmodern: Changing psychoanalytic attitudes toward homosexuality. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(2), 203-216.

- Elise, D. (1988). Penetrating psychoanalytic theory reply to commentary. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(3), 383-384.
- Elise, D. (1998). Gender repertoire body, mind and bisexuality. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(3), 353-371.
- The embodied subject minding the body in psychoanalysis. (2007) (J. Muller & J. Tillman, Eds.). New York: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Relational Psychoanalysis. Vol. 1: The Emergence of a Tradition. (1999) (S. Mitchell & L. Aron, Eds.). London: The Analytic Press.
- Fairbairn and the Origins of Object Relations. (1994) (J. Grotstein & D. Rinsley, Eds.). London: The Guilford Press.
- Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1994). Libido theory re-evaluated. In E. F. Birtles & D. Scharff (Eds.), *From instinct to self selected papers of W. R. D. Fairbairn* (Vol. II: Applications and Early Contributions, pp. 115-156). London: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1996). *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality*. New York: Routledge.
- Falco, K. (1991). *Psychotherapy with lesbian clients theory into practice*. New York: Brunner/Mazel Publications.
- Fast, I. The dynamic self in psychoanalytic psychology a formulation. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 5(3), 1995.
- Fast, I. (1984). *Gender identity a differentiation model*. London: The Analytic Press.

- Fast, I. (1991). Commentary on "father and daughter: Identification with difference - a contribution to gender heterodoxy." *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 1(3), 301--304.
- Fast, I. (1992). The embodied mind: Towards a relational perspective. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 2(3), 389-409.
- Fast, I. (1999). Aspects of core gender identity. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 9(5), 633-661.
- Fast, I. (1999). Reply to commentary. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 9(5), 675-682.
- Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). *Sexing the body*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.
- Feeling queer or queer feelings?. (2008) (L. Moon, Ed.). London: Routledge.
- Feinberg, L. (1996). *Trans gender warriors*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Female sexuality contemporary engagements. (1999) (D. Bassin, Ed.). Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Ferraro, F. (2001). Vicissitudes of bisexuality crucial points and clinical implications. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 82, 485-499.
- Flax, J. (1987). Re-Membering the selves: Is the repressed gendered. *Michigan Quarterly Review*, 26(1), 92-110.
- Fonagy, P. Thinking about thinking: Some clinical and theoretical considerations in the treatment of a borderline patient. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 72, 639-656.

- Fonagy, P. (1999, May 1). Transgenerational Consistencies of Attachment: A New Theory. Retrieved 2/2/2005, from <http://www.psychematters.com/papers/fonagy2.htm>.
- Fonagy, P. (2006). Psychosexuality and psychoanalysis: An overview. In P. Fonagy, R. Krause & M. Leuzinger-Bohleber (Eds.), *Identity, gender and sexuality 150 years after freud* (pp. 1-19). London: International Psychoanalytic Association.
- Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E., & Target, M. (2004). *Affect regulation, mentalization, and the development of the self*. New York: Other Press.
- Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (1999, May 1). Pathological attachments and therapeutic action. Retrieved 2/2/2005, from <http://www.psychematters.com/papers/fonagy3.htm>.
- Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2003). *Psychoanalytic theories: Perspectives from developmental psychopathology*. New York: Routledge.
- Fonagy, P., & Target, M. (2005). Mentalization and the changing aims of child psychoanalysis (1998). In L. Aron & A. Harris (Eds.), *Relational psychoanalysis innovation and expansion* (Vol. 2, pp. 253-278). London: The Analytic Press.
- Freud, S. (1953). The dissolution of the oedipus complex (1924). In *Standard edition* (Vol. 19, pp. 171-179). London: Hogarth Press.
- Freud, S. (1953). Female sexuality (1931). In *Standard edition* (Vol. 21, pp. 221-243). London: Hogarth Press.

- Freud, S. (1953). Femininity (1932-1933). In Standard edition (Vol. 22, pp. 112-135). London: Hogarth Press.
- Freud, S. (1953). The infantile genital organization (1923). In Standard edition (Vol. 19, pp. 139-145). London: Hogarth Press.
- Freud, S. (1953). The psychogenesis of a case of homosexuality in a woman (1920). In Standard edition (Vol. 18, pp. 145-172). London: Hogarth Press.
- Freud, S. (1953). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes (1925). In Standard edition (Vol. 19, pp. 241-258). London: Hogarth Press.
- Freud, S. (1953). Two encyclopaedia articles (1923 [1922]). In Standard edition (Vol. 18, pp. 233-259). London: Hogarth Press.
- Freud, S. (1974). On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomenon: Preliminary communication (1893-1895). In Studies in hysteria (Vol. 30, pp. 51-69). England: Penguin Books.
- Freud, S. (1977). Three essays on the theories of sexuality (1905). In On sexuality (Vol. 7, pp. 31-169). England: Penguin Books.
- Freud, S. (1984). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning (1911). In On metapsychology and the theory of psychoanalysis (pp. 30-44). England: Penguin Books.
- Freud, S. (1987). The ego and the id (1923). In On metapsychology and the theory of psychoanalysis (Vol. 11, pp. 339-407). England: Penguin Books.
- Freud, S. (1991). The essentials of psycho-Analysis (A. Freud, Ed.). London: Penguin Books.

- Friedman, R. (1997). Response to Ken Corbett's "homosexual boyhood: Notes on girlyboys." *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(4), 487-494.
- Frommer, M. (1994). Homosexuality and psychoanalysis technical considerations revisited. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4(2), 215-233.
- Gabbard, G. (1994). Commentary on papers by Tansey, Hirsch, and Davies. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4(2), 203-213.
- Gabbard, G., & Wilkinson, S. (1996). Nominal gender and gender fluidity in the psychoanalytic situation. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 1, 463-481.
- Gender in psychoanalytic space. (2002) (M. Dimen & V. Goldner, Eds.). New York: Other Press.
- Ghent, E. (1989). Credo: The dialectics of one-Person and two-Person psychologies. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 25, 169-211.
- Ghent, E. (1999). Masochism, submission, surrender: Masochism as a perversion of surrender (1990). In S. Mitchell & L. Aron (Eds.), *Relational psychoanalysis the emergence of a tradition* (pp. 211-242). London: The Analytic Press.
- Glazer, D. (1998). Homosexuality and the analytic stance: Implications for treatment and supervision. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 3(4), 397-412.
- Goldner, V. (1991). Towards a critical relational theory of gender. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 1(3), 249-272.
- Goldner, V. (2003). Ironic gender/Authentic sex. *Studies in Gender and Sexuality*, 4(2), 113-139.

- Gonsorek, J., & Rudolph, J. (1991). Homosexual identity: Coming out and other developmental events. In J. Gonsorek & J. Weinreich (Eds.), *Homosexuality* (pp. 161-176). London: Sage Publications.
- Goodman, G. (2002). *The internal world and attachment*. London: The Analytic Press.
- Green, A. (1996). Has sexuality anything to do with psychoanalysis? *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 76, 871-883.
- Green, A. (1997). The dead mother. In *On private madness* (pp. 142-173). London: Karnac Books.
- Green, A. (1997). Opening remarks to a discussion of sexuality in contemporary psychoanalysis. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 78, 345-350.
- Greenberg, J. (1991). *Oedipus and beyond*. England: Harvard University Press.
- Grotstein, J. (2000). *Who is the dreamer who dreams the dream?*. New Jersey: The Analytic Press.
- Halberstadt-Freud, H. (1998). Electra versus Oedipus femininity reconsidered. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 79, 41-56.
- Hansell, J. (1988). Reply to commentary. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(3), 379-381.
- Hansell, J. (1998). Gender anxiety, gender melancholia, gender perversion. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(3), 337-351.
- Harris, A. (1996). Animated conversation: Embodying and gendering. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 1(3), 361-383.

- Harris, A. (1996). The conceptual power of multiplicity. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 32, 537-552.
- Harris, A. (1999). Gender as contradiction. In S. Mitchell & L. Aron (Eds.), *Relational psychoanalysis the emergence of a tradition* (Vol. 1, pp. 306-335). London: The Analytic Press.
- Harris, A. (1999). Making genders commentary on paper by Irene Fast. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 9(5), 663-673.
- Harris, A. (2005). *Gender as soft assembly*. London: The Analytic Press.
- Harris, A. (2005). Multiple selves, multiple codes. In *Gender as soft assembly* (pp. 25-47). London: The Analytic Press.
- Hensel, B. (2005). An object relations view of sexuality based on Fairbairn's theory. In *The Legacy of Fairbairn and Sutherland* (pp. 68-79). London: Routledge.
- Hinshelwood, R. D. (1991). *A dictionary of Kleinian thought*. London: Free Association Books.
- Hirsch, I. (1994). Countertransference love and theoretical model. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4(2), 171-192.
- Hoeg, P. (1995). Smilla's sense of snow (T. Nunnally, Trans.) (p. 195). New York: Random House.
- Hoffman, I. (1998). Poetic transformations of erotic experience commentary on paper by jody messler Davies. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 8(5), 781-804.
- Holmes, J. (2002). *John Bowlby and attachment theory*. New York: Brunner-Routledge.

- Horney, K. (1973). The flight from womanhood. In *Feminine psychology* (pp. 54-70). London: W. W. Norton and Company.
- Horney, K. (1973). On the genesis of the castration complex in women (1922). In *Feminine Psychology* (pp. 37-53). London: W. W. Norton and Company.
- Identity, gender, and sexuality 150 years after Freud. (2006) (P. Fonagy, R. Krause, & M. Leuzinger-Bohleber, Eds.). London: International Psychoanalytic Association.
- Relational Psychoanalysis. Vol. 2: Innovation and Expansion. (2005) (L. Aron & A. Harris, Eds.). London: The Analytic Press.
- Jones, K. (2005). The role of the father in psychoanalytic theory: Historical and contemporary trends. *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 75(1), 7-28.
- Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*. (1996). .
- Kernberg, O. (1991). Aggression and love in the relationship of the couple. In G. Fogel & W. Myers (Eds.), *Perversions and near perversions new perspectives in psychoanalysis* (pp. 153-175). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kernberg, O. (1995). *Love relations normality and pathology*. London: Yale University Press.
- Kernberg, O. (2004). The influence of the gender of the patient and analyst on the psychoanalytic relationship. In *Contemporary controversies in psychoanalytic theory, techniques, and their application* (pp. 246-266). London: Yale University Press.

- Kernberg, O. (2004). Perversions, perversity and normality: Diagnostic and therapeutic considerations. In *Aggressivity, narcissism, and self-destructiveness in the therapeutic relationship* (pp. 76-91). London: Yale University Press.
- Kernberg, O. (2004). Unresolved issues in the psychoanalytic theory of homosexuality and bisexuality. In *Contemporary controversies in psychoanalytic theory, techniques, and their application* (pp. 60-74). London: Yale University Press.
- Klein, M. (1988). *Envy and gratitude 1946-1963*. London: Virago.
- Klein, M. (1988). *Love, guilt and reparation 1921-1945*. London: Virago.
- Kohut, H. (1977). *The restoration of the self*. Connecticut: International Universities Press, Inc.
- Lapl De Groot, J. (1933). Problems of femininity. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 2, 489-518.
- Lapl De Groot, J. (1982). Thoughts on psychoanalytic views of female psychology 1927-1977. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 51.
- Lang, J. (1984). Notes towards a psychology of the feminine self. In P. Stepansky & A. Goldberg (Eds.), *Kohut's legacy* (pp. 51-69). London: The Analytic Press.
- Langdrige, D. (2008). Are you angry or are you heterosexual? A queer critique of lesbian and gay models of identity development. In L. Moon (Ed.), *Feeling queer or queer feelings?* (pp. 23-35). London: Routledge.

- Layton, L. (2002). Gendered subjects, gendered agents: Toward and integration of postmodern theory and relational analytic practice. In M. Dimen & V. Golinder (Eds.), *Gender in psychoanalytic space* (pp. 285-311). New York: Other Press.
- Lear, J. (1990). Catharsis: Fantasy and reality. In *Love and its place in nature*. New York: Farrar, Strause & Giroux.
- Lear, J. (1990). What is Sex? In *Love and its place in nature* (pp. 120-155). New York: Farrar, Strause & Giroux.
- Lear, J. (2005). *Freud*. London: Routledge.
- Lesser, R. (1997). A plea for throwing development out with the bathwater: Discussion of Jessica Benjamin's "in defense of ambiguity." *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 2(3), 379-387.
- Lesser, R. (2001). Category problems: Lesbians, postmodernism and truth. In E. Gould & S. Kiersky (Eds.), *Sexualities lost and found* (pp. 125-134). Madison: International Universities Press.
- LeVay, S. (1996). *Queer science the use and abuse of research into homosexuality*. England: The MIT Press.
- Lewes, K. (1988). Theoretical overview I. In *The psychoanalytic theory of male homosexuality* (pp. 69-94). New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Lewes, K. (1988). Theoretical overview II. In *The psychoanalytic theory of male homosexuality* (pp. 173-183). New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Lewes, K. (1998). *The psychoanalytic theory of male homosexuality*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

- Lichtenberg, J. (2008). The Oedipus complex in the 21st century. In *Sensuality and sexuality across the divide of shame*. London: The Analytic Press.
- Lichtenberg, J. (2008). *Sensuality and sexuality across the divide of shame*. London: The Analytic Press.
- Loewald, H. (1979). The waning of the Oedipus complex. In *The essential Loewald collected papers and monographs* (pp. 384-404). Maryland: A Norman Quist Book University Publishing Group.
- Magee, M., & Miller, D. (1997). *Lesbian lives psychoanalytic narratives old & new*. London: The Analytic Press.
- Magee, M., & Miller, D. (2002). What sex is an amaryllis? What gender is a lesbian?: Looking for something to hold it all. In M. Dimen & V. Goldner (Eds.), *Gender in psychoanalytic space between clinic and culture* (pp. 207-234). New York: Other Press.
- Mahler, M., Pine, F., & Bergman, A. (1975). *The psychological birth of the human infant*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.
- May, R. (1986). Concerning a psychoanalytic view of maleness. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 73, 175-193.
- May, R. (1995). Re-Reading Freud on homosexuality. In T. Domenici & R. Lesser (Eds.), *Disorienting sexuality psychoanalytic reappraisals of sexual identities* (pp. 153-165). London: Routledge.
- Mayer, E. L. (1995). The phallic castration complex and primary femininity: Paired developmental lines toward female gender identity. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 43(1), 17-38.

- Mayer, E. L. (1999). "Everybody must be just like me": Observations on female castration anxiety. In D. Bassin (Ed.), *Female sexuality contemporary engagements* (pp. 377-404). Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc.
- McDougall, J. (1991). Perversions and deviations in the psychoanalytic attitude their effect on theory and practice. In G. Fogel & W. Myers (Eds.), *Perversions and near perversions new perspectives in psychoanalysis* (pp. 176-203). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McWilliams, N. (1996). A response to Jack Drescher's "a discussion across sexual orientation and gender boundaries." *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 1(3), 403-406.
- McWilliams, N. (1996). *Therapy across the sexual orientation boundary: Reflections of a heterosexual female analyst on working with lesbian, gay, and bisexual patients.* *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 1(2), 203-221.
- Melanie Klein first discoveries and first systems 1919-1932. (1990) (J.-M. Petot, Ed.) (C. Trollope, Trans.) (Vol. I). Connecticut: International Universities Press, Inc.
- Melanie Klein the ego and the good object 1932-1960. (1991) (J.-M. Petot, Ed.) (C. Trollope, Trans.) (Vol. II). Connecticut: International Universities Press, Inc.
- Melanie Klein today developments in theory and practice. (1988) (E. Bott Spillius, Ed.) (Vol. 2: Mainly Practice). London: Routledge.
- Melanie Klein today developments in theory and practice. (1988) (E. Bott Spillius, Ed.) (Vol. 1: Mainly Theory). London: Routledge.

- Mitchell, J. (1974). *Psycho-Analysis and feminism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Mitchell, S. (1981). The psychoanalytic treatment of homosexuality: Some technical considerations. *International Review of Psycho-Analysis*, 8, 63-80.
- Mitchell, S. (1996). Gender and sexual orientation in the age of postmodernism: The plight of the perplexed clinician. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 1(1), 45-73.
- Relational Psychoanalysis. Vol. 3: *New Voices*. (2007) (M. Suchet, A. Harris, & L. Aron, Eds.). London: The Analytic Press.
- Ogden, T. (1987). The transitional oedipal relationship in female development. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 68, 485-498.
- Ogden, T. (1989). *The primitive edge of experience*. London: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Ogden, T. (1989). The threshold of the male oedipus complex. *Menninger Clinic Bulletin*, 53(4), 394-413.
- Ogden, T. (1998). On the dialectical structure of experience. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, 24(1), 17-45.
- Ogden, T. (2006). Reading Loewald: Oedipus reconceived. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 87, 651-666.
- Olivier, C. (1999). Oedipal difference: Where the trouble starts. In D. Bassin (Ed.), *Female sexuality contemporary engagements* (pp. 445-463). Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Other banalities *Melanie Klein revisited*. (2006) (J. Mills, Ed.). New York: Routledge.

- O'Connor, N. (1995). Passionate differences lesbianism, post-modernism, and psychoanalysis. In T. Dominici & R. Lesser (Eds.), *Disorienting sexuality psychoanalytic reappraisals of sexual identity* (pp. 167-176). London: Routledge.
- O'Connor, N., & Ryan, J. (1993). *Wild desires and mistaken identities lesbianism and psychoanalysis*. London: Virago Press.
- Person, E., & Ovesey, L. (1983). Psychoanalytic theories of gender identity. *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis*, 11(2), 203-226.
- Perversions and near perversions*. (1991) (G. Fogel & W. Myers, Eds.). London: Yale University Press.
- Phillips, A. The uses of desire. In *Side effects* (pp. 161-181). New York: Harper Perennial.
- Phillips, A. (1994). *On flirtation*. Boston: Faber and faber.
- Phillips, A. (1994). On Flirtation: An Introduction. In *On Flirtation* (pp. xvii-xxv). London: Faber and faber.
- Phillips, A. (1995). Keeping it moving commentary on Judith Butler's "melancholy gender-refused identification." *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 5(2), 181-188.
- Phillips, A. (1997). Making it new enough commentary on paper by Altman. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 7(6), 741-752.
- Phillips, A. (1999). Having it both ways. In D. Bassin (Ed.), *Female sexuality contemporary engagements* (pp. 441-444). Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Psychoanalysis and Women*. (1973) (J. B. Miller, Ed.). England: Penguin Books.

- Psychoanalytic reflections on a gender-free case into the void. (2005) (E. Toronto, G. Ainslie, M. Donovan, M. Kelly, C. Kieffer, & N. McWillimas, Eds.). New York: Routledge.
- Quixotic desire: Psychoanalytic perspectives on Cervantes. (1993) (R. el Saffar & D. de Armas Wilson, Eds.) (p. 77). Ithica: Cornell University Press.
- Racker, H. (1982). The meanings and uses of countertransference. In Transference and countertransference (pp. 127-173). New York: Karnac Books.
- Reading Melanie Klein. (1998) (J. Phillips & L. Stonebridge, Eds.). New York: Routledge.
- Relational Perspectives on the Body. (1998) (L. Aron & F. S. Anderson, Eds.). London: The Analytic Press.
- Renik, O. (1994). Commentary on Martin Stephen Frommer's "Homosexuality and psychoanalysis." *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4(2), 235-239.
- Renik, O. (1999). Empiricism and clinically relevant theory building. In D. Bassin (Ed.), *Female sexuality contemporary engagements* (pp. 365-375). Northvale: Jason Aronson Inc.
- Schafer, R. (1974). Problems in Freud's psychology of women. *American Psycho-Analytic Association*, 22, 459-485.
- Schafer, R. (1997). On gendered discourse and discourse on gender. In *Tradition and change in psychoanalysis* (pp. 35-56). Madison Court: International Universities Press, Inc.

- Scharff, J. S. (2005). Satisfying, exciting, and rejecting objects in health and sex. In *The Legacy of Fairbairn and Sutherland* (pp. 80-88). London: Routledge.
- Schwartz, D. (1992). Commentary on "father and daughter: Identification with difference - a contribution to gender heterodoxy." *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 2(3), 411-416.
- Schwartz, D. (1995). Current psychoanalytic discourses on sexuality tripping over the body (R. Lesser, Trans.). In T. Dominici & R. Lesser (Eds.), *Disorienting sexuality psychoanalytic reappraisals of sexuality identity* (pp. 115-126). London: Routledge.
- Schwartz, D. (1999). The temptations of normality reappraising psychoanalytic theories of sexual development. *Psychoanalytic Psychology*, 16(4), 554-564.
- Sexual orientation and psychoanalysis sexual science and clinical practice.* (2002) (R. Freidman & J. Downet, Eds.). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sexualities lost and found lesbians, psychoanalysis, and culture.* (2001) (E. Gould & S. Kiersky, Eds.). Madison: International Universities Press, Inc.
- Shively, M., & De Cecco, J. (1977). Components of Sexual Identity. *Journal of Homosexuality*, 3(1), 41-48.
- Slouka, M. (May 2003). Arrow and wound: The art of almost dying (pp. 33-40). New York: Harper's Magazine.

- Sophocles. (1958). *The Oedipus plays of Sophocles* (P. Roche, Trans.). Ontario: Penguin Books Canada Ltd.
- Spezzano, C. (1994). Commentary on Martin Stephen Frommer's "Homosexuality and Psychoanalysis." *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4(2), 241-245.
- Spieler, S. (1984). Preoedipal girls need fathers. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 71(1), 63-80.
- Stack, C. (1999). Psychoanalysis meets queer theory: An encounter with the terrifying other. *Gender and Psychoanalysis*, 4(1), 71-87.
- Stern, D. (1985). *The interpersonal world of the infant*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.
- Stimmel, B. (1996). From "Nothing" to "Something" to "Everything": Bisexuality and metaphors of the mind. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 44 Supplement, 191-214.
- Stoller, R. (1974). Facts and fancies: An examination of Freud's concept of bisexuality (1973). In J. Strouse (Ed.), *Women and Analysis* (pp. 391-415). New York: Laurel Editions.
- Stolorow, R., & Atwood, G. (1991). The mind and the body. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 1(2), 181-195.
- Sweetnman, A. (1996). The changing contexts of gender between fixed and fluid experience. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 6(4), 437-459.

- Sweetman, A. (1999). Sexual sensations and gender experience the psychological positions of the erotic third. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 9(3), 327-348.
- Szasz, S. *The unspoken language of children (The body language of children)*. London: W. W. Norton and Company (Original work published 1980).
- Tansey, M. (1994). Sexual attraction and phobic dread in the countertransference. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4(2), 139-152.
- That obscure subject of desire Freud's female subject revisited. (1999) (R. Lesser & E. Schoenberg, Eds.). London: Routledge.
- Tuttman, S. (1986). The father's role in the child's development of the capacity to cope with separation and loss. *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis*, 14(3), 309-322.
- Tyson, P. (1982). A developmental line of gender identity, gender role and choice of love object. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 30(1), 61-86.
- Tyson, P. (1986). Male gender identity: Early developmental roots. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 73, 1-21.
- Tyson, P. (1994). Bedrock and beyond: An examination of the clinical utility of contemporary theories of female psychology. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 42(2), 447-467.
- Tyson, P. (1997). Sexuality, femininity, and contemporary psychoanalysis. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 78, 385-389.

- The vitality of objects exploring the works of Christopher Bollas. (2002) (J. Scalia, Ed.). Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.
- Whose Freud?. (2000) (P. Brooks & A. Woloch, Eds.). London: Yale University Press.
- Winnicott, D. W. (1971). The use of an object and relating through identifications. In *Playing and reality* (pp. 86-94). New York: Routledge.
- Wolf, E. (1988). *Treating the self*. London: The Guilford Press.
- Women and Analysis. (1974) (J. Strouse, Ed.). New York: Laurel Editions.
- Young-Bruehl, E. (2003). Beyond "The female homosexual." In *Where do we fall when we fall in love?* (pp. 214-245). New York: Other Press.